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The objective of this thesis is to prove that the Middle Eastern 
States, excluding Israel, experience political instability because 
the people lack state nationalism. State nationalism is defined as 
prid~ on the part of the people in their state to the extent that 
they transfer their primary loyalty from their village, ethnic, or 
religious group to the national government. The people will share 
a sense of oneness and a common identity with the government if they 
possess state nationalism. 
The methodology used in this paper was to apply the indigenous 
theory of Christopher Clapham to historical events and the political, 
social and economic institutions of Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt. Clapham's 
theory explains that political instability of third world states, 
which includes the Middle East, is the result of domination by western 
powers; lack of legitimacy of state government; distribution of political 
power within the state; lack of a broad power base of the government; 
lack of a shared value system between the government and the people; 
and the manipulation of state economic resources by government. 
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proved that the people lack state nationalism as a result of the char-
acteristics identified by Clapham's theory and has resulted in the 
political instability of each state. 
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I. WHY IS THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST POLITICALLY UNSTABLE? 
The Middle East appears to be a powder keg ready to explode. 
The national nightly news invariably includes reports of street battles 
between different groups in Lebanon, embroiled internal struggles 
in Iran and Iraq, as well as their continuing eight year cross border 
conflict. Leaders in Egypt and Lebanon have been assassinated during 
the past 10 years and the rulers and leaders in most of the Middle 
Eastern countries are continuously threatened by attempted coups and 
assassination attempts. These are all signs of political instability. 
Before attempting to explain the cause of the political instability 
experienced by the Middle East in the 20th century, it is necessary 
to define the terminology being used. 
Political instability refers to the inability of a country to 
maintain a governmental system capable of providing a legal and peaceful 
transition in national leadership as well as in the composition, leader-
ship and operation of the institutions of government to meet the needs 
and expectations of its citizens in a manner consistent with the pre-
vention of violent conflicts between groups or by groups against the 
government. 
The Middle East, as used in this paper, refers to Egypt, countries 
of the Arabian peninsula, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Lebanon. Israel is 
not included because it is predominantly Jewish and is not confronted 
by internal political unrest among its citizens. Israel does experience 
daily unrest in the occupied Palestinian areas of the West Bank. 
-1-
One of the major reasons Middle Eastern countries experience 
political instability is because they lack state nationalism. What 
is state nationalism? The term state nationalism used in this paper 
refers to the development of a sense of unity as one people on the 
part of the people within the geographic boundaries of a state. The 
people share a common identity and a sense of pride in their state 
and its identification as an independent entity of the world. State 
nationalism develops only after the people's pride in their state 
takes precedence over their ethnic or religious group membership. For 
example, a citiz:en of Lebanon would consider himself to be a Lebanese. 
The fact that he is a Christian, a Muslim, or an Arab is not of primary 
importance. 
Political scientists have tried to develop theories to explain 
the political and economic underdevelopment of third world states 
since the 1960's. Of the theories developed, Clapham's indigenous 
theory which advocates a study of the total internal composition of 
a state, its history and way of life, most completely explains the 
causes of the underdevelopment and resultant political instability 
in third world states. 
The development theory of Samuel P. Huntington is not sufficient 
to explain political instability in third world states because he sees 
2 
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the political structure within a state as being the primary criterion. 
Huntington states the lack of a single effective national authority, 
either democratic or dictatorial, prevents the establishment of political 
institutions and gradual incorporation of the people into the political 
system. The lack of political institutions and the exclusion of the 
people from participation in government, according to Huntington, is 
2 
responsible for third world state political instability. 
The dependency theory of Andre Gunder Frank is also insufficient 
in explaining political instability in third world states because he 
sees the development of capitalism during the colonization period and 
its continuation after independence as the culprit. Frank explains 
how capitalist economic systems developed an elaborate satelite-metro-
politan center system in third world states with the rural areas dominated 
by and furnishing raw materials to the urban areas who exported the 
raw materials to the dominant world capitalist powers. The exportation 
of raw materials to world capitalist powers prevented the industrial-
ization and economic development of third world states leaving them 
dependent upon economic aid and loans from international monetary funds 
for survival. According to Frank,the economic inequality within third 
world states and their lack of economic development explains their 
political instability. 3 
Clapham does not reject Huntington's and Frank's theories; he 
simply feels they are not sufficiently comprehensive. Clapham incorporates 
Huntington's developmental theory and Frank's dependency theory into 
his own theory and adds additional criteria. Clapham states the history 
of the third world states is very important because most of them were 
held as colonies of the western powers or were under the control of 
the western powers after World War I because of the League of Nations 
Mandate System. The League of Nations Mandate System and colonization 
allowed the western powers to create states and establish the system 
of government within those states according to their (western powers) 
desires rather than those of the people within the states. 
4 
Clapham identifies five additional characteristics within third 
world states which in many instances resulted from domination by the 
western powers and account for their underdevelopment and political 
instability. These characteristics include the manner in which political 
and economic power is divided within the state, the lack of legitimacy 
of the government, the lack of a broad political base by government, 
the lack of shared values between government and the people and the 
4 
manipulation of the state's economic resources by government. 
Most of the Middle Eastern States have their own political, social 
and economic characteristics separate and distinct from other states. 
Therefore, the theory developed by Clapham must be used in order to 
correctly establish the determinants of the political instability of 
the Middle Eastern States. Each of the six characteristics established 
by Clapham as explaining the causes of political instability in third 
world states which includes the Middle East will be explained in the 
pages that follow. 
1. Domination by Western Powers 
Clapham explains that most third world states, including the Middle 
Eastern States, were dominated by the western powers before and after 
World War I. The western powers drew the geographic boundary lines 
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without considering the ethnic, religious or cultural background of 
the people incorporated into the state. For example, Lebanon was created 
by France from the old Ottoman Empire and includedShiite and Sunni 
Muslims, Druze, and several Christian religious groups. The political 
and economic structures of third world states were established and 
controlled by the western powers consistent with their own interests 
and desires rather than the inhabitants of the state. The western 
powers also selected the leaders within the states they had created. 
For example, Great Britain imported the King of Iraq during the Mandate 
period from another area in the Middle East and used military force 
to require King Farouk to select a prime minister favorable to England. 
The economic system in the third world states was controlled by the 
western powers in such a manner as to benefit them monetarily. For-
example, Great Britain forced Iraq to give British companies control 
over the exploration and drilling of Iraqi oil. The ruling elites 
which had developed while under western domination attempted to continue 
the political and economic systems established by the western powers 
after gaining independence. The quest for control of the political 
and economic systems by members of the ruling elite and by those excluded 
from power by the ruling elite has led to tremendous civil disorder 
5 
within third world and Middle Eastern States. 
2. Division of Political Power Within The State 
According to Clapham, third world state power is usually strongly 
hierarchial, with power radiating from the capital through a set of 
territorial subdivisions. The type of political authority most prevalent 
in third world states is called "Patrimonialism" and is defined as a 
system in which authority is ascribed to an individual who is firmly 
anchored in a specific social and political order. The concept which 
underlies this type of authority is that of a father over his children. 
In this system, those down the political heirarchy are not subordinates 
but vassals or retainers whose position depends upon the leader to 
whom they owe allegiance. Neither the leader nor his followers have 
defined powers since what matters is not the amount of power but on 
whose behalf power is exercised. The system is held together by oaths 
6 
of loyalty or kinship ties. A government official considers his position 
to be personal property and his underlings to be personal subordinates. 
Clapham states the political system of the third world states today 
is more accurately called neo-patrimonialism since they are not feudal 
societies and officials in bureaucratic organizations do have defined 
powers. Thus the political system does have a rational legal basis. 
The division of political power in the states of the Middle East 
very closely fits the description given by Clapham. The countries 
are ruled by dictators supported by the military or monarchs. Some 
have tried to portray themselves in the manner described by Clapham. 
For example, Nasser was a very charismatic leader and Sadat tried to 
portray himself as a father to his people. 
3. Legitimacy of State Government 
According to Clapham, third world state governments lack legitimacy 
because they are not based on a widespread commitment to a form of 
government that can select and sustain political leaders. 
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Many third world states inherited constitutions drawn up by a colonial 
power prior to the granting of independence. However these constitutions 
were discarded or changed to suit the needs of the incumbent govern-
ment which had the effect of placing the power of the state in the 
hands of a ruling elite rather than the people. Constitutions drawn 
up after independence by the incumbent governments have not survived 
because the division of power was not based on the consent of the people 
but on the desires of the incumbent government. Bureaucracies and 
institutions of government do exist in third world states to provide 
benefits for the citizens and operate the institutions of state government. 
However, all power of government is held by the ruling elite and results 
in large amounts of personal and political corruption. In many instances 
various ethnic groups are included in the government but are excluded 
from power positions. Many third world states disallow any political 
6 party other than the ruling party. 
Some of the Middle Eastern countries have written constitutions 
but do not allow the provisions of the constitutions to be followed. 
For example, the Egyptian parliament has been powerless since its creation 
and has been used by Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak to rubber stamp their 
policies. A ruling elite is present in all the Middle Eastern countries 
and it is within that elite that many of the power struggles occur. 
4. Lack of Power Base of Government 
Clapham explains that the person who rules a state possesses all 
power. Therefore, competition occurs in third world states between 
organized political parties, if parties are allowed, between different 
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factions within society or on the part of the military to gain control 
of the state. The ruler of a state will either try to manipulate opposition 
groups by playing them off against each other or will simply destroy 
his rivals. Some rulers try to portray themselves as prophets who 
are trying to achieve some public and national goal. Other leaders 
may simply be tyrants whose personal desires dictate government action. 
A ruler must establish some type of coalition in order to stay 
in power. He may base his coalition on ethnicity, but this can prove 
to be dangerous if the excluded minority groups gather sufficient strength 
to successfully revolt. Serious and major revolts usually occur in 
countries ruled by a minority group. Leaders in countries which are 
predominantly one ethnic group may be overthrown by persons within 
their group who desire to gain control of the power of the state. Charismatic 
leaders whose dynamic personality helped them to gain power have appeared 
in some third world states but were unable to stay in power due to 
an insufficient power base. 
Some rulers of third world states attempt to base their coalition 
on residents of urban or rural areas. It appears the most successful 
leaders have been those able to gain the support of urban dwellers 
especially the professionals, students, trade unions and most importantly, 
the army. 
Since the governments in the Middle Eastern countries are dic-
tatorships, they lack a broad power base. Generally the ruler has been 
able to stay in power as long as he could retain the backing of the 
military. When dissention occurs among the people, rulers have used 
various tactics to retain control. Sadat attempted to use the religious 
extremists in Egypt to rid himself of trouble from the Nasserites which 
eventually led to his assassination. The leader of Iran is also the 
religious leader and advocated a return to a Muslim religious state 
as a method of gaining power. The power base of President Mubarak 
of Egypt appears to be the old traditional rural elites rather than 
the urban masses or peasants. 
5. Lack of Shared Value System Between Government and People 
According to Clapham, the Nee-Patrimonial authority system per-
petuates a political system based on the personal power of an individual 
whose power base is kinship ties or oaths of loyalty. This type of 
authority system prevents a shared value system between government 
and the people. It allows the official to return to the pre-colonial 
system in which one did not distinguish between his private and official 
self. A nee-patrimonial authority system has the same characteristics 
as tribal societies in which loyalty to one's group is the primary 
social value. This prevents the development of a national self identity 
or state nationalism. The artificial national communities created 
by the 19th century colonial powers and the incorporation of these 
societies into a global economy prevented a sense of common value, 
formation of a national self identity and development of a shared value 
system among the citizens of each state. 7 
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The lack of a shared value system between the government and the 
people is very evident in the Middle Eastern States. Since the governments 
are dictatorial, persons in government positions obtain and retain 
their positions and source of wealth by being loyal to the ruler. 
Loyalty to one's ethnic group as a primary value is particularly evident 
in Lebanon and has led to the destruction of the government. 
6. Manipulation of Economic Resources By Government 
Clapham states that third world state economic development policy 
is state development policy. The first priority of the state is to 
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maintain political control through the use of force or economic manipulation. 
The most profitable and easily controlled area of economic activity 
is that concerned with external trade and export production. All economic 
planning is done from the standpoint of political gain and the state 
becomes the broker between domestic and external interests. Many third 
world state leaders unfortunately are not concerned with correcting 
underdevelopment problems but with staying in power and must not endanger 
the consumption pattern of the urban area whose support is essential. 
Therefore economic concerns and funds are shifted from the countryside 
to the cities. Showpiece development projects are carried out which 
are politically rather than economically advantageous. Foreign aid 
is often used not to eliminate hunger and promote health but to help 
government maintain control. Most third world states are dependent 
upon international trade to generate revenues which are used to control 
the country and stay in power. Usually the economy is based on the 
extraction of commodities such as oil, minerals, etc. for trade on 
the world market. Many states have allowed large multinational cor-
porations to actually extract the goods for a share of the profits. 
Being tied to the exportation of goods usually results in importation 
of goods for domestic consumption rather than the development of domestic 
industries. When world markets decline, the exporting countries find 
themselves short of funds and borrow from international funds such 
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as the International Monetary Fund which has the effect of intensifying 
h . . 8 t eir economic problems and underdevelopment. 
All economic planning in the Middle Eastern states, with the exception 
of Lebanon, is done by the dictatorial governments in order to retain 
power. Since the Lebanese government is currently powerless, the factions 
militarily controlling specific areas of the state control the economic 
activity with their own area. 
The six characteristics identified by Clapham as being responsible 
for political instability in third world states are applicable to the 
countries in the Middle East. Some characteristics are more evident 
than others in various countries, but the total theory of Clapham does 
explain why the people of the Middle Eastern States have failed to 
develop state nationalism and are therefore politically unstable. 
I have chosen to apply Clapham's theory to case studies of Iraq, Lebanon, 
and Egypt with emphasis on developments within these countries since 
World War I. I will demonstrate how each of the characteristics described 
by Clapham had the cumulative effect of preventing the people of each 
state from uniting together as one people and therefore prevented the 
development of state nationalism. The people of Iraq and Lebanon place 
their first priority on loyalty to their ethnic or religious group 
rather than the state which has resulted in continuous political instability 
and unrest and in the case of Lebanon, political chaos. The people 
of Egypt are of the same ethnic and religious background. However, 
Clapham's theory is still applicable because the political power structure 
and economic manipulation he described was and is present. The people 
are not united as one people and do not share values with the governing 
elite. State nationalism is not the primary value of the governing 
elite nor among all political and religious groups in the country. 
12 
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II. INSTABILITY IN IRAQ 
Present day Iraq has experienced nine years of relative stability 
in government. Can the stability continue? Only future events will 
answer the question, but several factors such as the military's dis-
pleasure with President Hussein's handling of the Iran-Iraq war, serious 
economic problems resulting from the war, and the unrest among the 
people as a result of the war raise serious doubt about the continued 
longevity of the Hussein regime. 
Why is political stability a problem in Iraq? Because the people 
of Iraq like those in most third world states have not developed state 
nationalism because of the factors described by Clapham as being present 
in states who are politically unstable. What are these factors which 
are responsible for lack of state nationalism and the resultant political 
instability. According to Clapham's indigenous theory, a study of 
Iraq's history and the internal composition of its political, economic 
and social structure will answer the question. The reasons for Iraq's 
lack of state nationalism and political instability will be explained 
in accordance with Clapham's theory in the remainder of this chapter. 
Current day Iraq (once known as Mesopotamia) was part of the 
Persian Empire until 636 when it became part of Arabia. During the 
period of Arabian domination, the people were forced to convert to 
the Islamic religion and adopt the Arabic language. The period from 
750 to 1258 was known as the Golden Age of Islam due to tremendous 
advances in Science, Literature and Art. The people were split into 
Shiite and Sunni Muslims as a result of the schism which occurred 
in the Islamic religion following the death of Muhammed regarding 
the legitimate religious base of leadership succession and the correct 
interpretation of the Koran. In 1258, Julagu, the grandson of Genghis 
Khan, invaded Baghdad and destroyed five centuries of achievement. 
From 1258 to 1534, when it was taken from Persia by the Ottoman Turks, 
Iraq experienced constant turmoil due to fighting by the Sunni Muslim 
tribes of Northern Iraq, Kurdistan and part of Baghdad and the Shiite 
tribes of Southern Iraq and Baghdad. Iraq was ruled by the Ottoman 
Turks from 1534 to 1918. The Ottomans exercised little political 
control over Iraq and were primarily concerned with the collection 
of taxes. In order to effectively collect taxes, the strongest tribal 
chiefs were appointed by the Turks as governors of the provinces. The 
Turkish failure to develop unified political institutions or a central 
administration caused Iraq to become fragmented and created cleavages 
between the Sunni and Shiite Muslims, urban and rural populations, 
and the Arabs and Kurds. Constant local uprisings by the less powerful 
Shiite tribes in the south and the Kurds in the north occurred during 
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this period. 
Great Britain became interested in establishing trading posts 
in Iraq during the 17th century and accomplished this goal in the 
18th century with the establishment of a British East India Company 
trading center in Basra. The company used the trading center for 
direct intervention in non-commerical affairs. For example, they 
loaned the Pasha of Baghdad six ships to quell rebellious tribes, 
helped to appoint and unseat governors and arbitrated disputes between 
local chieftain. Although the region was legally part of the Ottoman 
14 
Empire, British power was supreme and by the 19th century a British 
diplomatic mission was established in Baghdad. The missions in Basra 
and Baghdad were considered vital to the protection of British interest 
in both Iraq and India as they feared Russian and German penetration 
into the area. 
1. Domination by Western Powers 
Since the Ottoman Turks were allied with Germany, Great Britain 
occupied Southern and Central Iraq when World War I began to prevent 
German occupation of Iraq which would threaten British trade in Iraq 
and India which was a British colony. By the end of the war, Great 
Britain was administering Iraq like a British colony with tight control 
over all government functions. According to Peretz,the British Acting 
CivilCommissioner in Iraq~ir Arnold Wilson, believed it was England's 
peculiar mission to bestow its gift of efficient administration, 
10 impartial justice, honest finance, and security on a backward people. 
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Sir Wilson said the Iraqis who demanded self government were ungrateful 
extremists and should be firmly repressed. In 1918-1919, Wilson arranged 
a plebiscite to determine whether the population favored a single 
Iraqi Arab country under British tutelage. He instructed the British 
officials to conduct plebiscites only when public opinion was likely 
to be in accord with the British desire for an single state under 
their control. None of the tribal unrest, Shiite demands for a theocratic 
Muslim state or Arab nationalist sentiments were reflected in the 
plebiscite results. 
Great Britain received the League of Nations Mandate in 1920 
to oversee the establishment and operation of government in Iraq. 
The boundary lines of Iraq as drawn by Great Britain in 1920 included 
the provinces of Basra and Baghdad and included a diversity of people 
whose previous history indicated an inability to peacefully coexist. 
Southern Iraq was inhabited predominantly by Shiite Muslims (40% of 
total population) who were less educated and much less prosperous 
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than the Sunni Muslims who inhabited Northern Iraq (35%). The Arab 
Sunnis had been educated and given preferential treatment by the Sunni 
Ottoman Turks. In addition, the country included a variety of Christian 
denominations and Jews. 
British High Commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, after replacing Sir 
Arnold Wilson in 1920, organized a provisional state council with 
the Baghdad Sunni leader as prime minister. Government posts were 
given to influential Iraqi families (mostly Sunni) and religious sects 
from various districts with each official guided by Cox, who had the 
final word in all matters. The British selected their wartime ally, 
Amir Faisal, a non-Iraqi Sunni Muslim and son of Sharif Hussan of 
Hejaz in Arabia, to be the leader of Iraq. By means of threats and 
political pressure, Sir Percy Cox obtained a unanimous vote for Faisal 
by the Iraqi Provisional Council and a 96% popular vote in a controlled 
plebiscite. In August, 1921, King Faisal I was crowned as the ruler 
of Iraq. Great Britain withdrew its acceptance of the League of Nations 
Mandate and incorporated the mandate principles into the 1922 Anglo-Iraqi 
treaty of alliance which gave Great Britain final control over Iraqi 
foreign, military, financial and judicial affairs and provided for 
the establishment of British military bases in Iraq. Using pressure 
tactics, High Commissioner Cox forced the Iraqi Constitutional Assembly 
to ratify the treaty in 1923. 
From 1920 to 1925, Great Britain and Iraq disputed the owner-
ship of the oil rich province of Mosul with Turkey. In 1925, the 
province was awarded to Iraq by the League of Nations on the condition 
that Great Britain guarantee minority rights to its residents until 
1950. The inclusion of Mosul would prove to be very troublesome in 
the future because it included a large number of Kurds who are Sunni 
Muslims of Persian descent with their own language and culture. The 
Kurds who constituted about 15% of the total population refused to 
cooperate with the Iraqi government and demanded an independent Kurdish 
State. 
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In 1930, Great Britain and Iraq signed a new 25 year treaty which 
became effective in 1932 and granted Iraq independence as a sovereign 
state. The British retained control of the Iraqi military and foreign 
affairs and maintained military bases in Iraq. Great Britain continued 
to play a dominant role in Iraq until the 1958 revolution which overthrew 
11 the King. 
2. Division of Power Within the State 
The first government of Iraq was a limited constitutional monarchy 
system. The King's power was extensive. He convened, adjourned, 
and dissolved the legislature: appointed Senators (delegates were 
elected); acted as Commander and Chief of the military: and appointed 
all government officials, including the prime minister and cabinet. 
King Faisal was supported by a group of Iraqi military officers 
who had served under him in World War I. They were placed in high 
government positions to prevent the power of government from being 
concentrated in the hands of the wealthy landowners, many of whom 
were tribal sheikhs. He appointed 14 different cabinets from 1922 
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to 1932 in an attempt to keep the government running and stay in power. 12 
According to Peretz, the governing elites considered their government 
positions to be their personal possessions and used them to further 
their own personal ambitions rather than to help and serve the people. 13 
King Ghazi succeeded his father in September, 1933 and ruled 
until his accidental death in April, 1939. He maintained the political 
system utilized by his father but was young (21) and inexperienced. 
He was unable to control the rivalry among the politicians. He appointed 
six prime ministers and 12 cabinets during his six year rule. During 
the 1920's the Iraqi Army had steadily gained power and by 1937 was 
the deciding factor in the rise and fall of virtually all cabinets. 
King Faisal II (infant son of King Ghazi) ruled Iraq from 1939 
until the military coup in 1958. His uncle and regent actually made 
all decisions until 1952 when King Faisal II reached age 18. Nine 
prime ministers and 22 cabinets were appointed during the period. 
Iraq was militarily occupied and controlled by Great Britain 
during World war II because they feared Iraqi cooperation and alliance 
with Germany and Italy. The creation of Israel as a nation at the 
expense of the Arab Palestinians, the overthrow of the monarchy in 
Egypt, Nasser's successful expulsion of the British from the Suez 
canal, Iraq's ill advised joining of the Baghdad Pact in which Great 
Britain was a member, the U.S. involvement in Lebanon under the Eisenhower 
Doctrine, and the joining of Syria and Egypt in the United Arab 
Republic had the effect of intensifying the distrust and hatred of 
the people of Iraq against the western powers and the Hashemite regime 
which had been pro-British except on the issue of the creation of 
14 Israel. 
The Free Officers of the Army under Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassim 
carried out a military coup on July 13 and 14, 1958 and placed the 
country under martial law. Brigadier Qassim became the prime minister 
and Col. Abdul Salem Muhammed Arif the deputy prime minister. 
Qassim was overthrown by a coalition of pro-Syrian and pro-Nasser 
Baathists both of whom favor pan-Arab unity and Arab socialism, in 
February, 1963. Brigadier Ahmad Hasan Al Bakr became prime minister 
and Col. Abdul Salam Arif became the new president. In November, 
1963, Arif led another coup, banned the Baathist Party, set up the 
Iraqi Socialist Party as the only legitimate party, sought union with 
Egypt and made the office of the presidency superior to all others. 15 
The army took control of the government on July 17, 1968 and 
Field Marshal Ahmed Hasan Al Bakr became the president of Iraq and 
commander of the military. He set up the Revolutionary Command Council 
19 
as the governing unit of the country and placed the country under 
pro-Syrian Baathist Party control. He appointed his nephew, Saddam 
Hussein al-Tahriti as vice chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council 
and in November, 1969, Saddam became the vice president of the country. 
Political parties who did not cooperate with the government were abolished. 
All government officials who were not members of the Iraqi Baath Party 
and all civil servants considered to be unfriendly to the party were 
removed. 
The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) whose members must be 
members of the Iraqi Baath Party, is the top decision making body 
of the State of Iraq and exercises all executive and legislative power. 
The RCC is headed by the chairman who is also the president of the 
country. He supervises the work of the cabinet and all institutions 
of government. President Al-Bakr held all power of government. He 
was president, prime minister, commander of the military, president 
of the RCC, president of the Iraqi Baathist Party and head of all 
16 branches of government. 
Saddam Hussein succeeded to the presidency in July, 1979. Imme-
diately upon gaining power, Saddam ordered a purge of the Baathist 
Party executive, the Revolutionary Command Council, cabinet and upper 
echelon of the government bureaucracy. Twenty-two men were executed 
and 33 were sentenced to prison. In essence, Saddam eliminated all 
those whom he saw as a threat to his control of the government. Saddam 
accused Syria of instigating a plot against him and ordered the Syrian 
embassy closed. This had the effect of terminating a year long attempt 
by Iraqi and Syrian Baathist parties to merge, reconcile their differ-
ences, and achieve a partial union. Saddam effectively ended any 
17 
prospect of a challenge from within the Baathist Party. 
Since 1958 the army has been in control of the government of 
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Iraq and even though a written constitution exists, the governmental 
system is in reality a military autocracy. The military has set aside 
constitutional law, ruled by decree and substituted coups for elections. 
The system used by each president since Qassim to maintain control 
of the army is to promote loyal officers to upper level jobs, transfer 
those who are questionable to unimportant positions or to arrest and 
execute those vehemently opposed to the president. 
The preceding pages have described the extent of political in-
stability within Iraq since the state came into being and has outlined 
how the power of government has always been held by the elites within 
the country. During the period when Iraq had a constitutional monarch 
system of government, persons who supported the King and after 1930's 
found favor with the army were able to hold influential positions 
21 
in the state and prosper economically. Since 1958, all power of govern-
ment has been held by the military but this did not promote stability 
because even the military was split between various factions who sought 
to gain and maintain power and place their policies into effect. At 
no time during the brief history of the State of Iraq has power of 
government been made available to all the citizens of the state. The 
Sunnis have held supreme power even though they are a minority in 
the country. 
3. Legitimacy of State Government 
The first Iraqi government lacked legitimacy because of the manner 
in which it was created by Great Britain. They chose a non-Iraqi 
monarch and manipulated a referendum of the population for approval 
of the King. The various minority groups, Shiite Muslims, and Kurds 
boycotted the election because they were opposed to the British in-
terference in their country and feared rule by the Sunni King. 
King Faisal appointed Sunni elites to the top positions in govern-
ment and ruled without a parliament until 1924. The first constitution 
of Iraq, was a result of a compromise between Great Britain and King 
Faisal r. rt established a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral 
legislature but the king could rule by decree in the absence of the 
legislature. Islam was the official state religion and Arabic the 
official language. The Muslim legal system was divided between Sunni 
and Shiite religious courts. Voting was not direct. Male subjects 
over 21 years of age who paid taxes could vote for district electors 
who in turn, chose representatives to the National Chamber of Deputies. 
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This electoral system allowed the leading Sunni families, Shiite religious 
leaders and tribal sheikhs to control the voting and place their own 
hand picked candidates in parliament. The Assyrian Christians and 
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Kurds were denied positions of influence in the government. 
The structure and operations of the Iraqi government remained 
as previously described until the military coup in July, 1958 with 
the exception of the gradual accumulation of a large portion of gov-
ernment power by the military. The military started the accumulation 
of power in the mid 1920's and by the mid 1930's was the dominant 
group since the monarch required their support in order to retain 
the throne. 
The government officials had repeatedly used the military to 
rid themselves of opposition and to repress the numerous Kurdish re-
volts. Thus, the military gradually realized their importance and 
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ultimate power. 
The military coup of July, 1958 ended the pretense of parliamentary 
government because elections have not been held since that time. A 
Provisional Constitution adopted within two weeks of the July, 1958 
coup did not include provisions for a return to representative government. 
The military placed the Revolutionary Command Council and the Iraqi 
Baath Party in control of the government in July, 1968. The 1968 
constitution issued by President Al-Bakr was never put into effect 
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and the RCC, of which Al-Bakr was president, ruled by decree. 
The Provisional Constitution of 1970 proclaimed Iraq as a 
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sovereign People's Democratic Republic dedicated to the ultimate reali-
zation of one Arab state and to the establishment of an Arab socialist 
system. Islam was designed as the religion of the state but since 
the Baathist Party is secular, Islam is not the basic source of law. 
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The constitution created three branches of government; the Revolutionary 
Conunand Council (RCC), the National Assembly and the Judiciary. The 
RCC is composed of 22 members elected by the majority of the Regional 
Conunand of the Baath Party. The National Assembly is to include 100 
members but the manner of their election was not stated and therefore 
has never been established. The Judiciary is to be appointed by the 
president. Since the president is the head of the three branches 
of government, he holds absolute power as long as he retains the backing 
of the military. 21 
According to Clapham, a state government lacks legitimacy if 
it does not have a widespread commitment to a form of government that 
can select and sustain politlcal leaders. Iraq's past history of 
frequent changes in government officials and numerous coups proves 
the country does not possess the necessary conunitment to select and 
sustain its political leaders. Iraq has not conducted the government 
according to the provisions of its ~onstitutions. The constitutions 
did not include provisions .which would enable the selection of leaders 
based on the consent of the people. Therefore, the government of 
Iraq does lack legitimacy. 
4. Lack of Power Base of Government 
Since King Faisal I was not an Iraqi but a British import, he 
attempted to establish a base of power by appointing fellow Sunni 
elites and military officers who had served under him, to important 
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positions in government. By the rnid-1920's, two opposing groups had 
formed in Iraqi politics. One group, the Ahd party, stressed Iraqi 
nationalism and the importance of economic and political development 
of the Iraqi state. They affirmed Arab brotherhood and solidarity 
with other Arab states but not to the extent of interfering in the 
affairs of other Arab states. This group also supported friendly links 
with Great Britain. The second group, the Ikhwa party (National Brotherhood), 
espoused a militant, extremely intolerant Arab nationalism which was 
opposed to the League of Nations Mandate and British interference 
as well as democracy. The Ikhwa party opposed King Faisal for his 
readiness to mediate with the British government and other outside 
influences. 
The 25 year treaty with Great Britain in 1930 which recognized 
Iraqi independence but granted military privileges to Britain such 
as the establishment of two air bases near Basra to be manned by British 
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troops for five years was vehemently opposed by the Ikhwa. 
After gaining independence as a state in 1930, the King attempted 
to form a coalition cabinet but the Ikhwa refused to participate since 
they refused to accept the British treaty. A transition government 
was then formed but was so severly attacked by the Ikhwa that the 
King appointed one of its leaders to head up a new government. 
During the reign of King Faisal's 21 year old son, Ghazi (1933-1939), 
the Ikhwa successfully undermined any government appointed by the 
King which was not headed by an Ikhwa leader. The Ikhwa was able 
to use the southern Iraqi tribal resentment of the national government's 
central authority to stir up rebellion against the government. The 
leaders of the southern tribes had been excluded from power by the 
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government. The Ikhwa also manipulated incidents which would renew 
Sunni-Shiite clashes. Tribal land disputes during this period further 
complicated the issue along with Shiite grievances regarding the mandatory 
1934 conscription laws and their exclusion from power by the Sunni. 
All of these events led to 12 days of revolts among all the tribes 
in the southern part of the Middle Euphrates in 1934. 
The King finally appointed members of the Ikhwa party to head 
up the government led by Prime Minister Yasin Al-Hashimi. Independent 
politicians and power hungry Baghdad officials used the Ikhwa's own 
strategy and again stirred up the tribes but this time the revolts 
were directed against the Ikhwa Party. General Bakr Sidqi resorted 
to martial law, put down the rebellion and disposed of the opposition. 
Al-Hashimi quickly concentrated power in his own hands, dissolved 
the Ikhwa Party and said he represented all groups in the country. 
Hikmat Sulayman, former Minister of the Interior under King Faisal I, 
who had been excluded from power in the Al-Hasimi government negotiated 
with General Bakr Sidqi and other army officers to overthrow the govern-
ment. By this time the army had become extreme nationalists and its 
officers believed a strong military regime was necessary to eliminate 
foreign control. The army desired to establish pan-Arab solidarity, 
to help sister Arab countries, especially Syria, trying to gain inde-
pendence from imperial domination and to bring about the necessary 
reforms for the establishment of law and order. The army basically 
controlled the government and the prime minister until 1942 when the 
. 23 British militarily occupied and controlled the country. 
The post world War II period was particularly turbulent and the 
people of Iraq were at the mercy of the groups attempting to gain 
power in order to implement their ideas and policies. The groups 
vying for power included the old conservative oligarchy, the Arab 
nationalists, liberals who wanted to establish democracy and ranking 
military officers who wanted to control the government. In addition 
to these groups, the country experienced continued tribal unrest 
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and Kurdish revolts. 
On July 13 and 14, 1958, a military coup occurred which placed 
the country under military control and in 1968 another coup placed 
the country under military and Pro-Syrian Baathist control. Iraq 
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is currently a military and Baath Party autocracy. 
According to Frederick w. Axelgard, political pressures against 
President Saddam Hussein's rule are reaching an intense level. 
He has been able to stay in power by manipulating the Baath Party 
Congress. In 1982, Hussein was able to shift the blame for the 
major defeat and subsequent retreat of Iraqi forces from Iranian 
territory to the Revolutionary Command Council. He used the same 
tactic following the 1987 Iraqi's defeat in Mehran, Iran. The 
events which have prompted opposition to Hussein in addition to 
Iraq's major military defeats in its' eight year was with Iran 
are the severe economic strains the war has placed on the Iraqi 
economy, dissatisfaction of Iraqi military officers with Hussein's 
leadership and tremendous social unrest as a result of the war 
and its economic consequences as well as the continuous Kurdish 
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revolts. 
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As has been indicated in the preceeding pages, the government 
of Iraq has since 1920 lacked a stable and broad base of power. When 
King Faisal I selected his fellow Sunnis to high positions, he placed 
a minority of the population in control of government. The Sunnis 
were not in agreement about the policies of government and very quickly 
split into factions. The King's attempts at coalition government 
was a total failure because of the opposition of the Ikhwa Party and 
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its deliberate agitation of the tribal groups in the Middle Euphrates. 
By the end of the 1930's, the army had become the power base of the 
government. However, this did not provide stability in government 
because the army was also divided into factions. Some military officers 
were pro-Nasser and others were pro-Syrian. If the military were 
a united group, the power base of the government would still be very 
insecure and would not provide stability because the military is Sunni 
dominated and does not represent the interest of the people. Those 
in power are simply determined to maintain power in order to serve 
their own self interest. Accordingly, Clapham's theory that the lack 
of a broad power base of government does contribute to the political 
instability in the country is accurate. This is thoroughly demonstrated 
by the number of changes in government leadership which have occurred 
along with the coups and periodic revolts. The historical data cited 
demonstrates the constant quest for power among various factions in 
Iraqi politics. 
5. Lack of Shared Value System Between Government and People 
Since the first King of Iraq was from Arabia, he did not have 
a common identity with the people of Iraq except that he was a Sunni 
Muslim which was also the religion of the minority but elite class. 
The people of Iraq did not possess a common national or state identity 
because the country as created by Great Britain included a religious, 
ethnic and tribal conglomerate of people. Under the Turks, the people 
had lived in tribal groups and developed a sense of tribal or ethnic 
group loyalty. King Faisal I excluded from power all groups except 
the Sunni elites who considered themselves as superior to all other 
groups. Those excluded from power had no incentive for cooperating 
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with or to shift their loyalty to the government. 
Forty percent of the people were Shiite Muslims, the Arab Sunnis 
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constituted 35% and 15% were Kurdish Sunnis who did not identify nationally 
or culturally with the Arabs. The Arab Sunnis had been educated by 
the Turks and had for centuries enjoyed greater power and economic 
prosperity than the Shiites. The Arab Sunnis used that power to keep 
the Shiites educationally, politically, socially, and economically 
inferior. Obviously, the Shiites strongly resented the position of 
prominence which the Sunnis enjoyed. Also,withir. Iraq was a small group 
of Assyrian Christians who were disliked by all Muslims because they 
were pro-British. The Kurds hated the Assyrians because they had 
cooperated with and been used by the British to put down Kurdish revolts 
28 during world war I. In 1930, about half of the population were nomadic 
or seminomadic tribes, about one third of the populations had settled 
on farms and about 12% were urban dwellers (mostly Arab Sunnis). 
Among the tribal groups, loyalty to their tribe and tribal leader 
was their first priority rather than religion. 
Within 10 years of gaining power, the Sunni elites were divided 
between those who wanted to develop their own country economically 
and politically and share a common identity with all fellow Arabs 
and those who wanted to join with other Arab countries to become one 
large Arab state. According to Penrose, nationalism in the fullest 
sense probably existed among a small number of educated people who 
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had some knowledge of European governments. 
Another factor which prevented the development of a united state 
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with a sense of common identity as one people was the role Great Britain 
played in Iraq after the state was created. The 1922 agreement between 
King Faisal and Great Britain allowed British advisors to ·emain 
in Iraq and tutor Iraqi officials. However, the advisors e~ercised 
considerable power especially until 1930 when Iraq was gran.ed independence 
and membership in the League of Nations. The people of Ira~ felt 
they were but a colony of Britain, and resented foreign interference. 
The British presence had the effect of causing the people to turn 
against the King and those in power because of their cooperation with 
the British. The Shiite and Sunnis did cooperate with each other 
briefly in 1920 in an attempt to prevent the British from taking control 
under the League of Nations Mandate but this was not based on nationalistic 
feeling. They simply shared a common anti-British sentiment. The 
Shiites wanted to prevent the establishment of any type of central 
authority because they feared Sunni domination. 
The emergence of the Ikhwa Party in the early 1930's was another 
decisive force because they were strongly anti-British, anti-Faisal 
and deliberately agitated the powerless tribal groups to create revolts 
and thereby force the King to give in to their demands for leadership 
. . . 30 positions in government. 
The numerous appointments of prime ministers and cabinets by 
the Kings from 1922 to 1958 did not in any was unify the country or 
help to create a sense of oneness among the people. Basically the 
shifts in government leadership were the result of quests for power 
among the Sunni elite. 
All power of government in Iraq has been in the hands of the 
military since the coup in July, 1958. Again this did not unify the 
country. It simply shifted power to a different group among the Sunni 
elite. At no time has serious consideration been given to granting 
proportional or equal power in government t~ the Shiites, Kurds, and 
other minority groups. To do so would invite disaster for the Sunnis 
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because they are a minority in the country. 
The three million Kurds in Iraq share a common identity with 
the eight million Kurds in Turkey and the five million Kurds in Iran. 
The Kurds consider themselves to be a distinct ethnic group who can 
trace their heritage to 614 B.C. when they ruled over Central Asia 
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in a tribal group called Medes. They feel they are entitled to the 
right of self determination and desire that all Kurds be allowed 
to form a separate state. According to Nader Entessar, the Kurds 
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possess ethnic nationalism because they share a common language (Kurdish), 
religion (Sunni), race (Persian nationality) and territory (mountain 
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regions of Iran, Iraq and Turkey). 
Successive Iraqi governments have tried unsuccessfully to acculturate 
the Kurdish people by suppressing Kurdish culture, education and political 
institutions. The Kurds resorted to guerilla warfare and refused 
to intermarry with non-Kurds since the 1920's in order to preserve 
their way of life. Faced with a war it could not win, the Iraqi government 
under President Hasan Al Bakr offered a new plan for Kurdish autonomy 
in March, 1974. The Kurds rejected the offer because they were militarily 
strong and receiving monetary and military assistance from the Shah 
of Iran and the United States. When the Shah signed an agreement 
of cooperation with Iraq in 1975, in an effort to save his own regime, 
and the United States shifted its priority to obtaining the Egyptian-
Israeli Sinai agreement, the Kurds were forced to reconsider. The 
acceptance of the 1974 Autonomy Law by the Kurdish Democratic Party 
under the leadership of Hashim Hassan Aqrawi caused a split for the 
first time in the Kurdish people. Two Kurdish groups, the Kurdish 
Democratic Party Provisional Leadership and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, 
continued to fight against the Iraqi government and their fellow Kurds. 
The Autonomy Law allowed the Kurds to control their own provincial 
government but the legislative and executive members who were Kurds 
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were appointed by President Saddam Hussein. The dissenting groups 
finally consented to cooperate with the Iraqi government in 1983 because 
they felt they could negotiate with President Saddam Hussein whereas 
20,000 of their fellow Kurds had already been killed by Khomeni in 
Iran. The Kurds simply were no longer able to continue the fight. 
The instability in the Iraqi government and any future changes in 
leadership may again alter the Iraqi-Kurdish peace. 33 
Irregardless of settlement of the Kurdish Revolt problem, no 
attempts have been made by the Sunni elites and President Saddam Hussein 
to truly unite the peoples of Iraq. 
6. Manipulation of Economic Resources by Government 
During the Ottoman period, land among the Shiite tribes in Southern 
Iraq was the property of the entire tribe who farmed it as a group. 
~bout 1900 the nomadic tribal system began to break down as large 
numbers of tribesmen settled permanently. To encourage permanent settlement 
and political stability, the British during the 1920's, King Faisal and 
his descendents in the 1920's and 1930's, passed legislation that turned 
tribal lands over to the sheikhs. The sheikhs became the legal landowners and 
the tribesmen were reduced to sharecroppers. By 1958, the tribesmen had 
become virtual serfs who had to pay~ive sevenths of their earnings to the large 
landowners. Much of the land in the north belonged to urban merchants who 
gained their wealth through inheritance or through confiscation of 
peasant land for non-payment of debts. Land was owned by a very few 
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large owners. Several estates were over 100,000 acres and the two 
largest were 250,000 each. The large landowners controlled not only 
the agricultural economy, they were also the group who possessed political 
power. The King needed their support to stay in power and thus they 
were allowed to control the peasants a virtual serfs. 34 
Great Britain used its League of Nations Mandate and subsequent 
Anglo-Iraqi agreements in 1922 and 1930 to obtain a strong control 
of Iraq's oil resources. The inclusion of the province of Mosul in 
the State of Iraq was the result of an agreement between France and 
Great Britain. France agreed to give up their claim to Mosul in exchange 
for British concessions in Syria and a share of Mosul oil concessions. 
After King Faisal I was placed on the throne, serious negotiations 
began to govern the exploration of Iraqi oil. The United States insisted 
that she be given a share of the oil concession because of her con-
tribution to the def eat of Germany and that Iraq be open to all companies 
who wanted to participate in the oil exploration. France had already 
claimed the German 20% of the Turkish Petroleum Company, Great Britain 
had claimed 70% and given 10% to the native government. 
The final agreement signed in 1925 set up 24 plots (each of which 
was 8 square miles) to be used for 75 years by the Turkish Petroleum 
company with a set royalty rate to be paid to the Iraqi government 
for the oil taken from their land. Within four years Iraq was to 
select 24 additional plots and make them available for bid to any 
oil company. The oil concession given to the Turkish Petroleum Company 
covered all of Iraq except an eastern area called Khanaquin and Basra. 
Therefore, any company obtaining a lease for oil paid the lease purchase 
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price to the Turkish Petroleum Company (now called Iraq Petroleum 
Company) but the royalties went to the Iraqi government. In 1931 
additional agreements were worked out between the Iraqi government 
and the Iraqi Petroleum Company to provide lump sum taxes to Iraq 
rather than an actual tax on the profits from the oil. By 1941 the 
Iraqi Petroleum Company working through subsidiaries had acquired 
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Iraqi government revenues rose from 4 million dinars a year in 
the period 1931 to 1935 to nearly 28 million dinars in the period 
1946 to 1950 about 12% of which was from oil, 25 to 26% from import 
duties and the remainder from indirect taxes, including an agricultural 
tax. Exports of cereal, dates, cotton and other agricultural products 
plus the oil exports allowed for increased imports. Until the 1950's, 
government revenues were insufficient to finance large engineering 
works necessary to control the Tigris-Euphrates Rivers and to set 
up irrigation projects to improve agricultural production. By 1950, about 
two thirds of the land titles of Iraq (excluding southern Iraq and 
the desert lands) had been settled. The transfer of land from tribal 
to private ownership placed much of the land in the hands of wealthy 
tribal sheikhs and town merchants who served as landlords over the 
peasants. Farming was done on a sharecrop basis. Basically, agriculture 
and industry during the monarch period in Iraq was a spoils system. 
Those who supported the government were given the opportunity to own 
and operate the farms and industries and accumulate wealth. Industrial 
investment was very small and out of 60,000 employed industrial enter-
prises in 1950,only 2000 worked in modern industrial plants. The govern-
ment expended considerable amounts of money on urban amenities and 
the larger towns changed rapidly but by 1950 only 40 towns had piped 
water. No town had municipal sewage but electricity, which was British 
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owned, was widely available. 
By 1950, only 20% of the people had attained a standard of living 
that would be described as healthy or comfortable and only a very 
few could afford or had access to luxury items. After the overthrow 
of King Faisal II in 1958, the government attempted to bring about 
agrarian reform modeled after the program in Egypt. The land reform 
law called for the expropriation of 75% of privately owned arable 
area, limited the amount of land one person could own, and stated 
the expropriated land would be redistributed to small owners. The 
land reform program was never completed and less than one third of 
the land was ever redistributed. The remainder of the land was placed 
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under the control of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and farmers cultivated 
it based on agreements with the ministry. In 1961 the Iraqi government 
expropriated 99.5% of the land granted to the Iraqi Petroleum Company 
and in June, 1972 nationalized the Iraqi Petroleum Company. By 1973, 
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Iraq had complete control of its own oil for the first time. 
In 1970 new agrarian reform laws further reduced the amount of 
land which could be privately owned and sought to bring agriculture 
and industry into government hands. A 1975 law broke up the estates 
of tribal landowners. Currently the government intention is to develop a 
very capital intensive collectivized agriculture with farmers working on 
state land as state employees. The same policy has been implemented 
with reference to industry. Industry was nationalized in 1964 and 
38 
all large industries are now owned and operated by the government. 
In 1970, 90% of Iraq's Gross Domestic Product was the result 
of oil revenues. The Iraqi government has used these revenues to 
purchase equipment, building materials, etc. from foreign suppliers 
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rather than develop domestic industries to supply the needed products. 
Iraq's eight year war with Iran has drastically reduced its oil 
revenues and thereby its Gross National Product. In 1980 oil revenues 
were $26.1 billion a year or 66% of their Gross National Product. 
By 1984, oil revenues had declined to $10.4 billion a year or 34.3% 
of their Gross National Product. The decline is the result of the 
closing of many Iraqi ports which required them to transport the oil 
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overland to Turkey, Jordan, and Kuwait. Iraq's prolonged war with 
Iran has forced it to borrow from foreign nations. Iraq's esti~ated 
debt in 1987 was between $40 and $60 billion at least half of which 
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was owed to Arab states. 
Conclusion 
The historical data presented in the previous pages concerning 
political and economic developments in Iraq from 1920 to the present 
explain why political instability is and has always been a problem. 
The basic reason for the political instability is that the people 
of Iraq lack state nationalism. They are not united with a sense 
of oneness and do not consider themselves Iraqis above any other loyalty. 
The people still give their loyalty to their religious, ethnic or 
tribal group rather than the government which represents all of them. 
The reasons for the lack of state nationalism are in accordance 
with the criteria established by Christopher Clapham. The people 
and government of Iraq were controlled by Great Britain from 1920 
to 1930 under the League of Nations Mandate and subsequent Anglo-Iraqi 
treaties. Great Britain imported a King from Arabia and established 
a government which was Sunni dominated and friendly to them rather 
than one which would be consistent with the needs and desires of the 
people. The distribution of power in government has always been among 
the Sunnis who are a minority in the country. The Sunnis had power 
under the monarch system from 1921 to 1958 and still retain power 
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under the military autocracy. The government of Iraq has lacked legitimacy 
from its inception. The monarch system was created by Great Britain 
and forced on the people in 1921 and the current government is the 
result of a military coup in 1958. At no time have the citizens of 
Iraq been given a legitimate voice in government or been consulted 
about its formation. Great Britain did manipulate a referendum when 
the monarchy was created but that could hardly be considered legitimate. 
Although Iraq does have a written constitution, the government does 
not abide by its provisions. 
The government of Iraq throughout its history always operated 
without a broad base of support and used force and control of economic 
resources to stay in power. Since government power has always been 
in the hands of a Sunni minority who constitute only 35% of the popu-
lation, it has been necessary to use force to stay in power. 
since the state of Iraq was created from three provinces of the 
ottoman Empire and included a conglomerate of people, they do not 
and have never shared a common value system and have not developed 
a common identity or sense of oneness as a people. The Sunni dominated 
government has always excluded all other groups from power and economic 
prosperity and has thereby prevented a sense of nationalism. 
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The economic resources of Iraq have been under the complete control 
of the monarch until his overthrow in 1958 and under the control of 
the military since that time. In the 1920's, 1930's and 1940's, most 
of the oil resources were actually controlled by foreign owners (primarily 
British). The agriculture and industry were basically controlled 
by the King and those who supported him (spoils system). Since 1958 
and 1964, agriculture, land and industry respectively have been govern-
ment owned and operated. The oil industry was nationalized in 1972 
and is now government owned and operated. Basically the system in 
Iraq could be called Arab Socialism because the government owns and 
operates the means of production and the state plans the entire economy. 
Iraq's eight year war with Iran has had severe economic consequences 
with a resultant huge foreign debt. This has added to the unrest 
in the country and has the potential for creating additional political 
instability in Iraq. 
Political stability in Iraq can be achieved over a period of 
time only if the political leaders change their policies. They must 
stress Iraqi nationalism instead of Arab nationalism. They must grant 
equality to the people and gradually incorporate them into the political 
system. only then will state nationalism and political stability 
develop. 
III. CHAOS IN LEBANON 
A civil war has been raging in Lebanon since April, 1975 and 
at the current time seventeen different groups are vying for power 
in the state. Lebanon is not a united state but is fragmented to 
the extent that it is most accurately described as several mini states 
within a state. Why does chaos exist in Lebanon? Because the people 
do not possess state nationalism which means they are not loyal to 
their state national government. Instead they are loyal to their 
specific ethnic or religious group. A study of the history of Lebanon 
and its internal political, economic and social institutions reveal 
that Clapham's indigenous theory is applicable and does explain the 
causes of the instability and chaos in Lebanon. An examination of 
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the six basic characteristics delineated by Clapham as being responsible 
for instability in third world states, as they appear in the history 
of Lebanon, will be presented in the remainder of this chapter. 
Lebanon is the only country in the Middle East, except current 
Israel, which was not predominantly Muslim inhabited. The area was 
originally occupied by Phoenician merchants until the 7th century 
when the Arabian armies invaded. The Arab Muslims were never able 
to gain total control of the northern mountain regions. The mountains 
became a refuge for Christians with the Maronite Christians being 
the dominant group. Arab customs and social values did penetrate 
the Christian areas and Arabic became the adopted language by the 
13th century. 
By the end of the 11th century, Maronite Christians, Shiite Muslims, 
and Druze dominated the Lebanese mountains. Maronites were predominant 
in the north and Shiite Muslims formed the majority in the remainder 
of the region. During this period, followers of Egyptian Fatima Caliph 
al-Hakim (985-1021) entered the area led by the disciple Darazi. 
They joined with local Lebanese and formed the distinctive community 
known as the Druze. 
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The European Crusaders invaded Lebanon in the 12th century. The 
large French contingent among them established ties with the Maronite 
Christians that would serve as the basis of the future special relation-
ship between France and Lebanon. The failure of the Egyptian Fatima 
in Cairo, who had gained control of Mount Lebanon from the Sunni Caliphate 
in Baghdad, to protect the Shiites from the crusaders led to the decline 
of their influence in Lebanon. Sunni Muslims organized and drove 
the Crusaders from the Middle East. Thereafter, the Sunnis dominated 
Egypt, Syria and Lebanon and attempted to force the Shiites and Druze 
in Lebanon to become Sunnis. 
In 1516 the Ottoman Turks (also Sunni Muslims) conquered Lebanon 
and controlled the area for four centuries. The Ottoman Turks continued 
the Arab policy of allowing a local Lebanese notable to rule a semi-
autonomous state. The Druze Ma'an and Shibab princes ruled the area 
until 1840 when Bashir Shibab was exiled for forming an alliance with 
Egyptian leaders against the Turks. During this period, the Maronite 
Christian community, with the support and assistance of France, grew 
in population and prosperity and moved southward. The Turkish Sultan 
had allowed Louis XIV of France to adopt and become the special guardian 
of the Maronites in 1649. 
In an effort to prevent Christian-Muslim conflicts in the area, 
the Turks divided Lebanon into two districts. The northern district 
was tq be placed under a Christian subgovernor and the south under 
a Druze. The period 1840-1861 was marked by constant turmoil as the 
Christians supported by France and the Druze supported by Great Britain 
clashed. Following direct European intervention, Mount Lebanon was 
reunited and made a semiautonomous governorship. The governor was 
a non-Lebanese Ottoman Christian appointed by the Sultan with the 
approval of the European powers. The governor was aided by an elected 
administrative council with each religious group equally represented. 
This system remained in effect till the end of World War I when the 
area came under the control of France by virtue of a League of Nations 
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1. Domination by Western Powers 
When the American King-Crane Commission visited Lebanon in 1919, 
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they learned that the Maronite Christians desired close ties with 
France because they feared control by Arab Muslims who were the dominant 
group in the Levant (Syria and Lebanon). The Arab Muslims opposed 
separating Syria and Lebanon. The commission recommended that Lebanon 
be given a degree of independence as an autonomous government within 
the Greater Syrian State. The League of Nations Mandate assigned 
both Lebanon and Syria to France with the condition they be governed 
as separate parts of one political entity. 
In order to establish a base of French influence in the Muslim 
Middle East, France separated Lebanon from Syria with the Maronite 
Christian dominated Mount Lebanon as the heartland of the State. They 
tripled the area of Lebanon by adding the cities of Beirut; Tripoli 
in the North; Sidon in the South and the fertile Biqa Valley in the 
East. Southern Lebanon was predominantly Shiite; Maronite Christians 
dominated the North; and the remainder of the country was a mixture 
of Muslims and Christians. According to Peretz, the Muslim areas 
were included to justify the continuation of French control of the 
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area. 
France tightly controlled Lebanon until the end of World war 
II through a high commissioner who held absolute power and was usually 
an army general. According to Peretz, the governmental system was 
dual in nature because the French felt the native population must 
be educated and prepared for independence and self government~4 The 
native government was assigned specific duties by the French and was 
staffed by Lebanese. The high commissioner organization was staffed 
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by French political and military officers who took charge of the departments 
of security, education, public works, antiquities, and an organization 
for Beduoin affairs. The high commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction 
over customs, communication and transportation, and if he was a military 
person, he commanded the Lebanese army. In the event the native government 
proved deficient, the high commissioner would correct the mistakes 
and could impose martial law if deemed necessary. A staff of information 
officers operated in every district in Lebanon and kept the high com-
missioner informed of political sentiments. French administrators 
and technical advisors were hired (not part of the high commission 
organization) and attached to various native government departments 
with status as Lebanese government officials. 
According to Peretz, government officials (French) were often 
4$ 
corrupt and operated in an arbitrary manner. Local employees were 
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not chosen wisely, properly trained, or given an appropriate measure 
of responsibility. Consequently, public services were poorly developed. 
The first native government was elected and established in 1919 
based on the old Ottoman Central Administrative Council. However, 
it was soon abolished by the French and replaced by a more pliant 
appointed administrative commission which consisted of 15 members 
and included all religious groups. Six members were Maronite Christians, 
three Greek Orthodox, two Sunnis, two Shiites, one Druze and one Greek 
Catholic. When the appointed commission was replaced in 1922 by an 
elected representative council, this religious proportionment was 
maintained. 
Under the direction of the French, a constitution was written 
and implemented in 1926 which established a Lebanese republic with 
a president and cabinet responsible to a bicameral legislature. Both 
houses of the legislature were joined into a unicameral system in 
1927. This system of government was called the confessional system 
and continued the division of power with the government on the basis 
of religion. By unwritten tradition, the president was always a Maronite 
Christian, the prime minister a Sunni and the President of the Chamber 
of Deputies a Shiite. Foreign affairs was Christian controlled and 
defense was usually in the hands of a Muslim or Druze chief. The 
French commissioner retained ultimate control over the native constitutional 
government. 
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The dual French High Commission and native Lebanese governmental 
system stayed in effect till the outbreak of World war II in 1939. 
At that time, France abolished the Lebanese government and constitution 
and assumed total control. 
When the French were defeated in 1940, Lebanon was occupied by 
the Italians until June, 1941, when it was liberated by allied Free 
French and British forces. From June, 1941, until December, 1946, 
a constant political battle existed between Great Britain and the 
Free French under General Charles de Gaulle because of Free French 
efforts to regain Mandate control of Lebanon. Only the threat of 
military action by Britain forced the Free French to withdraw. By 
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1947, Lebanon was a free and independent state. 
2. Division of Political Power Within the State 
The National Pact of 1943 governmental system in Lebanon was 
negotiated by Christian Maronite leader Bishara al-Khoury and Sunni 
Pan-Arab leader Rijad Solh. It allowed the Maronite Christians to 
retain control of the presidency; the premiership was reserved for 
a Sunni Muslim; speaker of the parliament was to be a Shiite Muslim: 
the deputy speaker of the parliament was to be a Greek Orthodox Christian: 
and the Army Chief of Staff a Druze. Parliament was to be divided 
according to a 6 to 5 Christian-Muslim ratio and the same ratio was 
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to be maintained in the cabinet and bureaucracy. 
The National Pact political system in Lebanon preserved the power 
of the various ethnic, religious and communal leaders and prevented 
the development of a parliamentary political system which would cut 
across communal and religious boundaries. For example, if a specific 
office was to be filled by a Sunni, the Sunni leadership felt they 
had the right to clear the candidate for the office. Consequently, 
the traditional patron-client system evolved into one of personal 
and family gain and the exploitation of the community by its elites. 
Widespread corruption and nepotism occurred which prevented new leader-
ship groups from emerging. The entire system caused the further polar-
ization of the political system along religious and ethnic lines rather 
than the development of the sense of oneness as Lebanese. 
President al-Khoury (1943-1952), who was supported by the old 
wealthy Maronites, ignored Lebanon's internal problems and the need 
for fundamental social reform. Nearly all political activity was 
concerned with private affairs. The political corruption began to 
arouse popular feeling as scandal after scandal was reported in the 
press. Al-Khoury retained political control through manipulation 
of election lists, bribery, threats, buying off and beating up of 
journalists and the paying off of the judiciary. A rigged election 
in 1947 provided a parliament of al-Khoury's supporters who adopted 
a constitutional amendment permitting the president to succeed him-
self. The constitution provides for a single six year term of office. 
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A coalition of nine parliamentary deputies, who had resisted al-Khoury's 
threats, led by oruze leader, Kemal Jumblatt, and progressive independent 
Maronite, Camille Chamoun, organized an unlawful public rally against 
al-Khoury. When the army refused to back al-Khoury, he resigned in 
1952. 
The National Pact system stayed in effect in Lebanon until the 
beginning of the current civil war in April, 1975 when the political 
system began to disintegrate. Although the structure of the government 
today is still maintained, it is a hollow shell. various ethnic group 
leaders still occupy the positions of president, premier, speaker 
of the parliaments, etc. but the offices are powerless because the 
power within Lebanon belongs to the different groups who militarily 
occupy specific communities within the state and control all activity 
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within that community. 
President Camille Chamoun (1952-1958) began the process which 
finally led to the destruction of the National Pact system. Chamoun 
lost the support of Jumblatt when he refused to consider social and 
constitutional reform and concentrated instead on building his own 
political machine. He pushed election reforms through parliament 
which excluded the traditional Sunni, Shiite and Druze leaders from 
government and stacked parliament with pro-Chamoun Muslims. This 
resulted in Lebanon's first civil war as ousted leaders rallied their 
followers against the government. In addition, strong Arab Nationalist 
sentiments had developed in Lebanon due to Nasser's emergence as a 
hero to the Arab world following his expulsion of the British from 
the Suez canal. Nasser called for a union of all Arabs. The Druze 
supported the revolution for their own political reasons. Syria gave 
financial and military supply support to their fellow Sunnis. At 
the request of Chamoun, President Eisenhower sent U.S. Marines to 
Lebanon to restore peace. They did not become militarily involved 
but their presence helped to neutralize the situation and preserved 
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the political system. Parliament elected General Fuad Shehab to replace 
Chamoun. 
President Fuad Shehab (1958-1964) was supported by the traditional 
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leaders. He was able to calm the situation and adopted a pro-Nasser 
foreign policy which appeased the Muslims. Shehab disrupted the delicate 
balance of power in government by adopting a paternalistic centered 
political policy which concentrated all power in his hands and a trusted 
kitchen cabinet headed by Elias Sarkis. Shehab used the military 
intelligence bureau to maintain control and sponsored the formation 
of the Phalange Party, a countryside Maronite radical political orga-
nization, which rapidly surplanted the traditional patron-client re-
lationship of the Maronite oligarchy based on clan or village. 
Charles Helou (1964-1970) was a very weak president. His weakness 
and that of the national government allowed the interference of other 
states and organizations in the internal affairs of Lebanon. The 
1967 Arab-Israeli War resulted in the immigration of 400,000 Palestinians 
and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leaders to Lebanon. 
The PLO commandoes used Lebanon as a staging area for raids against 
Israeli settlements which resulted in Israeli retaliatory raids into 
southern Lebanon. The actions of Israel in or toward Lebanon since 
1967 have had a very detrimental effect upon the stability of the 
government. When the Lebanese army finally made an attempt to control 
the PLO, the Muslim leaders in Lebanon invited President Nasser of 
Egypt to negotiate an agreement between the PLO and the Lebanese government. 
The Cairo Agreement worked out by Nasser gave the PLO autonomy in 
Lebanon while maintaining the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon. 
However, the real outcome of the Cairo Agreement was the official 
sanction of another decisive force, the PLO, in Lebanon. The Phalange 
Party felt they had been betrayed and proceeded to build a strong 
militia to defend themselves. 
In 1970 a coalition of Maronite leaders elected Suleiman Franjieh 
as President of Lebanon. Franjieh was a traditional Maronite from 
Northern Lebanon, who had his own private army. He ha previously 
used it against agitators who threatened to involve the country in 
clashes with Iran. Franjieh was associated with thP 
Chamounists and blamed former President Helou for allowing 
the Palestinian guerillas to threaten the sovereignty of Lebanon. 
Franjieh excluded Druze leader Jumblatt from power in the government. 
Jumblatt immediately organized the National Movement, a coalition 
of radical and leftist parties, who began to call for the dismantling 
of the National Pact system. The National Movement formed their own 
militia. In 1970 Jordan expelled the PLO and they immediately set 
up headquarters in Beirut. This led to intense fighting between the 
PLO and Israel and eventually to the destruction of the power of the 
Lebanese. 
From 1973 to 1975 continued clashes between Sunnis, Shiites, 
Druze and Maronites along with the continued PLO raids and Israeli 
reprisals caused the deterioration and final disintegration of the 
Lebanese political system. The Syrian Army entered Lebanon in 1976 
in support of the PLO and to help control the violence in Lebanon. 
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Syria had been intervening since 1969 through the pro-Syrian Palestinian 
guerilla group, saiga, by giving political and economic support to 
various factions within Lebanon. 
The 1973 Arab oil Embargo gave not only wealth but tremendous 
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power to the Arab states and greatly increased the confidence, pride 
and feelings of power of the Arab Muslims in Lebanon. The assassinations 
of Maanuf Saad, Sunni leader of the Populist Nasserite Organization, 
the assassination of two bodyguards of Maronite leader, Pierre Gemayel, 
and the resulting massacre of 27 Palestinians by the Maronite militia 
in 1975 ended the National Pact system of government. Tbe civil war, 
which is still raging today, started at that time~9 According to Norton, 
the power of the national government has been totally destroyed and 
is now held by the seventeen factions who control all political and 
economic activity within the area of Lebanon over which they have 
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military control. The powerlessness of the state national government 
is demonstrated by the fact that when Syria attempted to negotiate 
a ceasefire and solution to the violence in Lebanon in December 1985, 
the persons included in the conference were the leaders of the various 
militias rather than the President, Amin Gemayel, and other traditional 
51 leaders. 
The division of political power within the government of ·Lebanon 
from the beginning of the Mandate period until the civil war began 
in 1975 meets the definition given by Clapham as being present in 
third world states who are politically unstable. The Confessional 
and National Pact system divided the power of government on the basis 
of religion. This system concentrated power is the hands of the traditional 
leaders of the various religious communities who were able to call 
upon village and family loyalties to win elections. Because the central 
government was based on a coalition of the religious groups within 
the country and could only function effectively with a consensus, 
it was a weak government. This allowed government officials to develop 
tremendous personal power because they dispensed public services to 
their constituents and thereby solidified their personal power base. 
Members of parliament maintained support by the distribution of funds 
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to buy votes, bribes, bringing voters in from other districts, etc. 
Another factor which was very important and detrimental to the stability 
of the Lebanese government was the continuation of Maronite Christian 
domination of the political system after independence, usually through 
corrupt means, which resulted in the further polarization of the country 
along religious lines. Since the civil war began in 1975 the country 
has been continuously splintered into factions based on religion and 
ideology. All of these factors prevented the people from developing 
an identity as Lebanese. Instead, they remained primarily Shiites, 
Sunnis, Druze, etc. 
3. Legitimacy of the National Government 
Of the states in the Middle East, Lebanon's early government 
most closely correlated to Clapham's definition of a state which possesses 
legitimacy because it did have a system of government with a written 
constitution designed to select and sustain political leaders. The 
1926 constitution was continued by agreement between the Maronite 
Christian and Sunni Muslim leaders after gaining independence in 1946. 
Several factors prevented the Lebanese system from being truly legitimate 
because they prevented the government from being created by the consent 
of the people which resulted in discord and eventual civil war. First 
was the decision by France to separate the areas which constitutes 
current Lebanon from Greater Syria based on their desire to create 
a French dependency in the Middle East rather than the desires of 
the people of the area. Second was the creation of the Confessional 
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system of government which was drawn up by the Maronite Christian 
and Catholic leaders under French supervision rather than representatives 
from the various ethnic and religious groups. Third was the Sunni 
refusal to accept their share of the power of government or participate 
in government because they wanted to be part of Syria which was also 
predominately Sunni. The Shiites refused to support the Confessional 
system because they were leary of Sunni reaction since they were dominated 
by the Sunnis who are a large majority in the Muslim world. The Sunnis 
feared domination by the Maronite Christians who were the single largest 
group and feared the Maronites would try to make Lebanon a Maronite 
national homeland. 52 
By the mid 1930's the Muslims were participating in the government 
but the seeds of discord remained. Although many disputes occurred 
between the Muslims and Christians and within each group, they were 
able to keep the government functioning until 1958. However, the 
Christian-dominated government did not provide the same level of government 
services and projects to the Muslim communities, particularly the 
Shiite communities, as were provided for the Christian communities. 
. . . 53 This widened the gap between the Christians and Muslims. 
The first civil war occurred in 1958 because the Christian President, 
Camille Chamoun, attempted to seize more power by excluding influential 
Muslims from power. Arab Nationalist sentiments had also grown strong 
among the Muslims. From 1958 to 1975, the Christian and Muslim groups 
within Lebanon became more divided and formed additional parties 
and militias. since 1975 the government has been u~able to function 
in a manner consistent with maintenance of control and protection 
for its citizens and has been unable to prevent interference from 
the PLO, Syria and Israel. Syria presently dominates activities of 
the government in Lebanon to the extent that the president is not 
consulted about developments within the country. 54 President 
Gemayel's term of office expires in September, 1988. 
It is not possible to determine at this time whether an 
attempt will be made by the Lebanese parliament to fill 
the vacancy. 
4. Lack of Power Base of Government 
The Lebanese government did not have a firm and large base of 
power from its inception because the Muslims, both Shiites and Sunnis, 
refused to participate or support the government and Christians were 
divided over the issues of pan-Arabism. The Greek Orthodox who were 
the second largest Christian group supported the Sunni idea of union 
with Syria. They had been able to peacefully coexist in the urban 
areas alongside the Sunnis for centuries and did not fear a Sunni 
Muslim government. The Maronite Christians and other small Christian 
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groups established and dominated the government. 
The Muslim and Christian leadership who set up the National Pact 
system of government in 1943 did so to reorganize the political and 
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economic system for their own benefit. The political leaders considered 
their government position to be a personal possession and used it 
to benefit themselves at the expense of their communities. Therefore, 
each individual developed a personal power base which prevented the 
development of a broad power base for the central government as a 
cohesive unit. According to OWen, the system would have remained stable 
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only if the Sunnis and Maronites had continued to cooperate; if the 
leaders had been able to retain the backing of their respective com-
munities; and if the other communities, particularly Druze and Shiites, 
had been willing to claim their share of the power and cooperate with 
th t 56 . e sys em. Since none of these conditions were met, the political 
system did not remain stable and began in 1958 to come apart. 
The National Pact system was put into effect during the al-Khoury 
Administration (1943-1952) with al-Khoury,a Maronite Christian, as 
president, and a Sunni Muslim as prime minister. Both were the dominant 
figures and beneficiaries of the system. The speaker of the delegates, 
a Shiite, was primarily a ceremonial rather than a political job. 
Intense rivalry developed among the sect leaders for a share of the 
political power and resulting economic benefits. Al-Khoury tried 
to create a balance between his Christian followers and the Arab popu-
lation. In order to appease the Muslims, he adopted a pro-Arab foreign 
policy. Al-Khoury~ admission of 150,000 Palestinian refugees to Lebanon 
following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War was a fatal mistake with 
reference to the future stability of the government of Lebanon. Al-
Khoury's administration was noted for its nepotism and corruption. 
He resigned only when the army refused to militarily back his attempt 
to stay in power as a result of election fraud. 
According to Khalidi, the population of Lebanon had doubled by 
1956, but the Christian dominated government refused to conduct a 
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national census after 1932. A great disparity existed between the 
Christian and Muslim communities with reference to services provided 
by the government and living conditions because the Maronites dominated 
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government basically took care of its own communities. The incorporation 
of the coastal cities of Beirut, Tyre, Sidon, and Tripoli into Lebanon 
in 1920 meant the presence of a large urban Muslim group and a large 
Shiite Muslim group in Southern Lebanon. When Nasser successfully 
ejected the British from Egypt in 1956 and became the hero of the 
Arab world, the Muslim masses and their leaders in Lebanon adopted 
a pro-Nasser attitude and began to demand a union of Lebanon with 
Egypt. President Chamoun's election reforms which effectively elimi-
nated the traditional Sunni, Shiite and Druze leaders from power in 
1958 further splintered the power base of the government and destroyed 
the fragile coalition between Muslims and Christians under the National 
Pact system. 
The final destruction of the Muslim-Christian coalition occurred 
during the Shehab administration (1958-1964) when he took power of 
government in his own hands and used the military intelligence to 
control the dissenters in the country. Shehab also started the Phalange 
Party with its own militia which prompted the other Christian Maronites 
to organize their own party, Kata'ib, with its own militia. 
Charles Helou (1964-1970) was a very weak president and had no 
power base of his own. He was controlled by former President Shehab, 
the military intelligence, and the Phalange Party. During his adminis-
tration, the PLO gained a strong foothold in Lebanon and additional 
political movements with supporting militias were formed. 
In 1967, the Lebanese Parliament approved the establishment of 
the supreme Islamic Shiite Council with Imam Musa al-Sadr as president. 
With the backing of Syria he built a powerful movement within five 
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years called the Movement of the Disinherited which undermined the 
traditional Shiite leadership. Al'Sadr demanded the Shiites be given 
a larger share of the power of government and that previously neglected 
Shiite communities be developed. His place was taken by Nabih Berri 
in 1978 when al-Sadr disappeared in Libya, and Berri now controls 
the strong Shiite militia, Amal, which controls portions of the Shiite 
communities. 
Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druze, formed a coalition of radical 
and leftist parties in 1969 called the National Movement which immediately 
called for the deconfessionalization of the Lebanese political system 
and the dismantling of the National Pact of 1943. A pro-Syrian Pal-
estinian guerilla group, Saiga, was formed in 1969 with the backing 
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of the Syrian military. 
Since the beginning of the civil war in April, 1975, several 
additional groups and organizations have emerged in Lebanon both Christian 
and Muslim. The National Liberation Party is a coalition of non-Maronite 
Christians; Marada is the militia of ex-president Franjieh; the Lebanese 
Force is a coalition of Christian militias; and the Lebanese army 
has split into two factions. Major Sa'ad Haddad leads the Lebanese 
Army Militia which is supported by and cooperates with Israel in the 
security zone between Israel and Lebanon. The Lebanese Arab Army 
split from the regular Lebanese army in 1976 and established headquarters 
b . 59 in the Biqa Valley and is supported Y Syria. 
The Shiite Muslims have split into three major factions. Amal 
(hope), led by Nabih Berri, is the largest group and calls for a pluralistic 
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state in which the Shi'i'tes would enJ'oy h · · t eir rightful proportional 
share of power. The Hezbullah (party of God) has close ties with 
Iran, advocates the creation of an Islamic state, and is believed 
to be responsible for many extremist car bombings and other terrorists 
acts. The Islamic Jihad (holy war) is a shadowy extremist group about 
which very little is known but which takes credit for assassinations 
d .. d 60 an suipi e attacks. 
The Sunni community is urban, well educated and trustee of the 
prime minister position in the government. It is the most politically 
fragmented of all the ethnic and religious groups in Lebanon. Each 
area, mostly urban, is controlled by its Sunni leader and his own 
private militia. No united or large Sunni group exists except the 
PLO which is not Lebanese but exiles from Jordan and Israel. The 
PLO is split into four camps. Yasser Arafat's Fatah group is the 
major conservative group while the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine and the Democratic Party for the Liberation of Palestine 
are both extreme Arab Nationalists. Both call for the ovez:hrow of 
the traditional regime in Lebanon and the establishment of ~evolutionary 
61 proletariat power. The PLO Fatah Uprising group led by Sae~d Masa 
is Syrian backed and since 1983, has fought against Arafat's group 
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for control of PLO areas in Lebanon. 
The Druze are the only group in Lebanon that is not fragmented. 
They are firmly controlled by Walid Jumblatt who heads their militia 
and is the president of the Progressive Socialist Party. Jumblatt 
is backed by both Libya and the Soviet Union. According to Norton, 
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Jumblatt clearly aspires to dominate the political system in Lebanon. 
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Syria militarily occupied the Biqa Valley in June, 1976 when 
political initiatives failed to stop the civil war in Lebanon. The 
Arab League sent in a deterrence force (ADF) to impose a cease fire 
but its composition was 80% Syrian. Israel invaded Southern Lebanon 
in March, 1978 and the alignment of the Christian militias with Israel 
against the PLO placed the ADP on a collision course with the Christian 
government. When intense fighting between the ADF and Lebanese Christian 
militias continued, President Elias Sarkis asked the Arab world to 
resolve the conflict. All Arab forces except Syrian left Lebanon. 
By the end of 1978, various groups had begun to claim and militarily 
occupy pa"rts of Lebanon resulting in the fragmentation of Lebanon 
into eight zones of military occupation. 
In June, 1982, Israel carried out a massive invasion of Lebanon 
with the intent of driving both the PLO and Syria from Lebanon and 
the re-establishment of a government friendly to Israel. They success-
fully ejected the PLO and although inflicting a humiliating defeat 
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on the Syrian army, stopped their military drive at Beirut. 
According to Deeb, it appeared peace was in sight when Bashir 
Gemayel, who had united the Christians and seemed to be able to command 
the respect and cooperation of the Arab Muslim communities, was elected 
president in 1982.65 His assassination in September, 1982, shattered 
all hopes of a united Lebanon. His brother, Amin Gemayel was elected 
president one week later by parliament. Negotiations to settle the 
civil war dragged on until September, 1983 when Israel decided to 
withdraw from Beirut to the Awwali River and establish a military 
security zone between Israeli and Lebanon. Intense fighting erupted 
between various Christian and Musl1"m groups 1·n d or er to occupv the 
areas vacated by Israel. 
Syria re-entered the arena in May, 1984 and tried to re-establish 
itself as the mediator in Lebanon. The Shiites and Druze fear Syrian 
intervention as it may prevent them from turning military gains into 
political gains. The Christians were opposed to the Syrianization 
of Lebanon but later came to realize Syria was the only group capable 
of safeguarding their rights. 
The PLO re-established itself in the Palestinian refugee camps 
in Beirut and Sidon in the mid-1980's. It has an underground force 
in Southern Lebanon which strikes against Israel and has friendly 
relations with a number of the Lebanese factions. However, it has 
not regained the power it had in the late 1960's and early 1970's 
and has been prevented by Syria from re-establishing itself in the 
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Biqa Valley. 
Syria currently occupies a large portion of Lebanon and attempts 
to negotiate a peace. According to Norton, Damascus has tried to 
bolster the Lebanese elements that serve its interests and can exercise 
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effective control over parts of Lebanon. Each faction in Lebanon 
appears to want peace but on its own terms. Leadership struggles 
within the Shiite, Sunni and Maronite communities continue as well 
as intersector fighting. Lebanon today is a fragmented and partitioned 
state whose official government is totally ineffective. 
The historical data presented in the foregoing pages dramatically 
demonstrates Clapham's assertion that one of the characteristics re-
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sponsible for political instabilty in third world states is the government's 
lack of a broad power base. The development of a power base by each 
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government official in his own community and among his religious group 
prevented the development of a broad power base of the national government. 
The fragmentation of the political system into seventeen militarily 
controlled areas by various groups and factions within each group 
indicates the powerlessness of the national government as well as 
the lack of a sense of state nationalism on the part of the people. 
5. Lack of Shared Value System Between Government and People 
Clapham's theory states that one of the reasons for political 
instability is the fact that the people do not have a common value 
system. Why do the people of Lebanon lack a shared value system? Because 
the state was created from a conglomerate of ethnic and religious 
groups who still place their loyalty to that group over loyalty to 
the state. 
In the original area known as Mt. Lebanon, the Druze chieftains 
held power as early as the 13th century. By 1840 a large Christian 
middle class had emerged as the educated and professional group due 
to French support and the Christian missionary educational systems. 
By 1861, Mt. Lebanon had become an autonomous province within the 
Ottoman Empire under the administration of the Christians. This gave 
them a sense of pride in their identity and of national achievement, 
particularly among the Maronite Christians who saw the autonomous 
province as a step toward full Christian Lebanese nationahood. Lack 
of ports and suitable agricultural land restricted the economic potential 
of Mt. Lebanon and Christian Lebanese nationalists began to solicit 
international help, particularly from France, for the enlargement 
of the territorial boundaries of Mt. Lebanon to include the coastal 
cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon and Tyre along with the Biqa Valley. 
The French Mandate in 1918 enabled the Christian Maronites to achieve 
their goal. However, the incorporation of the predominantly Muslim 
coastal cities into the new state of Lebanon, rather that providing 
the economic prosperity envisioned by the Christian Maronites, es-
tablished a politically fragmented society. The first loyalty of 
the people of Lebanon remained with their ethnic or communal group 
on whom they depended for daily support, stability and services. 
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The Christian Lebanese Maronites felt that when Lebanon was created 
in 1920 it possessed certain fundamental attributes ·which differentiated 
it from the rest of the Arab world and justified its independent status. 
One of the major contributors to the Lebanese Confessional system 
of government, Michel Chiha, stressed the Phoenician background of 
the people and stated the country was the legitimate heir to the Phoenician 
tradition. Christian writers began to call for a Phoenician Renaissance. 
The writings of Chiha and others provided grounds for disassociating 
Lebanon from Arabism and appealed to the Christian middle class because 
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it promoted the image of Lebanese as traders. According the Entelis, 
the Christians considered Lebanon to be a territorial refuge for Christians 
which would protect them from Muslim attempts to subjugate and disperse 
69 them. As a minority people living is an Islamic state (under Ottoman 
Turks), a "persecutionists" mentality developed among the Christians 
which served to unify them. Although a homogenous nationalistic attitude 
did not exist among all of them, the Maronite community did manifest 
a community consciousness. The Maronites did possess distinct 
ethnic characteristics, a single religion and a long history as a 
compact minority. 
A second ideology prevalent among the Lebanese Christians was 
Mediterraneanism which sought to link Lebanon's physical and cultural 
origins to a Mediterranean basis as a means of distinguishing it from 
the Arab world. Both Phoenicianism and Mediterraneanism ideologies 
were strong during the 1930's and 1940's and although supported on 
a limited basis by organized groups, they were strongly supported 
by militant Lebanese Maronites. Both movements were concerned with 
countering Arab nationalism and Syrian nationalism rather than develop-
ing a viable Lebanese nationalist ideology which would make Lebanon 
a cohesive state. 
One of the strong factors which divided Muslims and Christians 
was the strong Christian attachment to western and Christian ideas 
and systems. 
The Muslim masses, on the other hand, have a strong psychological 
attachment to a pan-Arab nationalist identity because it satisfies 
their need to retain a Muslim identity. Pan-Arab nationalism stresses 
both the Arab and Islamic components of the Muslim identity. The 
Muslim identity not only includes a sense of being Arab and belonging 
to the Arab nation but also the political unity and a sense of being 
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a part of the wholeness of the Arab world. The Muslim communal attachment 
serves not only parochial needs but also the individual's daily support 
because the religious organizations provide services such as medical 
care, etc. This weakens the dependence of the Muslims on the central 
authority of the national government and the link between the individual 
and the state. This decreases the chances of creating a unified state. 
The Sunni Muslims considered Lebanon to be ethnically, 
culturally, historically and geographically Arab. They desire to 
incorporate and rejoin Lebanon with Syria and thereby become part 
of the Arab world. Since the Arab world is 85% Sunni, they would 
be among people with whom they share a common identity. The Sunnis 
suffered a loss of prestige and recognition when incorporated into 
the Christian Maronite dominated Lebanon because they had been the 
dominant and privileged group under the Ottoman Turks. They strongly 
resented their minority status in Lebanon. 
The Syrian nationalists also deny Lebanon's separate political 
existence and seek to reintegrate it as a subordinate unit of the 
70 
Syrian nation. 
The Shiite Muslims were initially content with the Confessional 
system established by the. Christians but did not participate in the 
government until the mid 1930's because they feared Sunni retaliation. 
However, during the 1940's and 1950's, the Shiites began to demand 
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additional shares of government power in accordance with their increased 
population and a fair share of government services, programs and develop-
ment projects. The Shiite communities had been ignored by the Sunnis 
and Christians and as a result were far behind in development. 
The Druze constitute about 7% of the Lebanese population and 
are also disgruntled about the 1943 National Pact because it permanently 
blocks them from holding top government jobs. They argue that they 
have historically played an important role in the history of Mt. Lebanon 
and cannot accept being relegated to a secondary and insignificant 
role in government. The Druze basically feel they should be able to 
retain their own ethnic culture and govern affairs within their own area 
(Shauf Mts.) and should have an equal voice in the national government. 
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The primary value among Christians, Muslims and Druze throughout 
the history of Lebanon has been loyalty to one's ethnic or religious 
group. The Confessional and National Pact system intensified rather 
than reduced the ethnicity of each group. As the Muslim population 
in Lebanon increased, the Christians feared they would become a minority 
group in a predominantly Sunni Muslim world and began to manipulate 
the political system to insure their continued domination in Lebanon. 
The Muslims reacted to Christian seizure of power with violence after 
negotiations failed. As the Christian-Muslim-Druze schism deepened, 
radical and fundamentalist groups have emerged and placed a portion 
of Lebanon under their military control. Extremists Shiite groups 
are now calling for the creation of Lebanon as an Islamic state. 
Entelis suggests that four possible options are now open to the 
Lebanese as a way of solving their dilemma. The first option would 
be assimilation, in which the cultural traits of minority communities 
would be eliminated and replaced by an Arab nationalist culture. 
It is very doubtful the Druze and Christians would agree to this. 
The second option would be a policy of separatism in which each ethnic 
group would retain control over its own province, which is essentially 
the status of most of Lebanon except that specific boundary lines 
for each group are not established. The third option would be a policy 
of segregation according to ethnic group which is favored by feudal 
chieftains and local bosses. The final option would be a pluralistic 
society in which state nationalism would be the first priority of 
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all groups. All of these options would require a consensus among 
the people of Lebanon which will be very difficult, if not impossible 
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to achieve at this time. 
6. Manipulation of Economic Resources by Government 
The Confessional and National Pact political system in Lebanon 
was responsible for the Maronite Christian domination of the economy 
with a five to one control over commerce and industry. A patron-client 
system was retained in which the political leaders saw their government 
position as personal property and handed out government jobs, services 
and development programs to their supporters and ethnic groups. Since 
the Christian Maronites retained all the important and influential 
government positions, they were able to not only control the economy, 
but bring about the development and prosperity of the areas inhabited 
by their ethnic and religious group. The Shiite Muslim and Druze 
communities, because of the minimal power of their leaders in the 
Lebanese government, did not share in the development and prosperity. 
The Sunnis had a share of the prosperity but not an equal share because 
they did not have an equal share of government power. 
The economy of Lebanon was very prosperous prior to the 1975 
civil war. It was one of the most prosperous non-oil producing countries 
in the Middle East with a per capita income higher than oil rich Iraq. 
Seventy percent of the nation's income was from tertiary sources such 
as real estate, tourism, and international banking which not only 
created an inflation problem for Lebanon but spelled economic disaster 
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when the civil war prevented the continuation of these enterprises. 
A substantial amount of Lebanon's income was due to the exportation 
of manufactured and agricultural goods to Saudia Arabia. About three 
to four billion dollars a year was received from Lebanese working 
abroad, and large sums entered the country in the form of subsidies 
to the Palestinians and various militias. The civil war disrupted 
the export business. The Israeli invasion of 1982 destroyed valuable 
assets such as orchards, warehouses, etc. in Southern Lebanon, particu-
larly in Shiite communities, and prevented the marketing of goods. 
Israel also subsidized businesses of Lebanese Christians who supported 
them which not only destroyed Shiite ability to compete but resulted 
in a Saudia Arabian embargo on Lebanese goods on the grounds they 
might be coming from Israel. The fighting in Southern Lebanon has 
caused a great deal of destruction to Shiite and Palestinian refugee 
camps. Over 25,000 buildings were severly damaged and 500,000 Shiites 
were displaced when the Lebanese Army bulldozed their shantytowns 
in the suburbs of Western Beirut. The enforced evacuation of the 
PLO leadership in August, 1982 from Beirut and Tripoli in November, 
1983, caused the loss of most of the factories, schools and clinics 
which produced some of the jobs of Palestinians and deprived all of 
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them of general welfare programs. 
The Lebanese pound faltered only slightly until the Israeli in-
vasion in 1982. It plunged from 3 pounds per U.S. dollar in 1982 to 
74 
21 pounds per U.S. dollar by mid 1985. 
The economy of the State of Lebanon today is as fragmented as 
its political system because the economic activity of each area of 
the country is controlled not by the national government but by one 
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of the seventeen groups who militarily controls all activity within each 
sector. 
Conclusion 
The validity of Clapham's indigenous theory is proven when applied 
to Lebanon. Basically, Clapham's theory states you must study the 
history and political, social and economic institutions of third world 
countries in order to ascertain the reasons for their political in-
stability. Clapham identified six characteristics present in third 
world countries which explain the reasons for their instability. 
The first characteristic identified by Clapham was the domination 
of third world states by the Western powers. Lebanon was totally 
dominated by France from 1919 until 1943. The French established 
a dual governmental system but the native government was totally sub-
servient to France. The most critical development during the period 
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of French domination was the establishment of native governmental 
positions on the basis of religion. This deeply entrenched the religious 
polarization already present among the people and prevented the develop-
ment of state nationalism or a sense of oneness among the people. 
The French established the native government is such a manner as to 
give dominant power to the Maronite Christians who were very pro-French 
because they (French) desired a base of influence in the predominant 
Muslim Middle East. 
The incorporation of the predominant Muslim cities of Beirut, 
Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre; Biqa Valley; and predominant Shiite Southern 
Lebanon into the new State of Lebanon was the first major mistake. 
The new state began its existence populated by people with divided 
sympathies. They were divided along religious and ethnic lines. 
The nature of the power structure of the political system in Lebanon 
which was based on ethnicity and religion rather than a national consensus 
contained the built-in elements necessary for self-destruction. The 
domination of the government and economic resources by the Christian 
Maronites with the resulting denial of equal or proportional power 
to the Muslims and Druze destroyed the legitimacy of the government. 
According to Clapham, a government is not legitimate unless it is 
designed to select and sustain political leaders. Although the early 
government of Lebanon meets the basic definition, it was not le-
gitimate because the government was imposed upon the people by France. 
It was not established based on the consensus of the people and did 
not operate according to the desires of the people because it allowed 
the Maronite Christians to dominate all other groups. The distribution 
of government power on the basis of religion and ethnic groups enforced 
and intensified a value system in which one's first priority was his 
ethnic or religious group. This prevented the development of state 
nationalism or a sense of oneness among the people. State nationalism 
was present among the Christians, particularly the Maronites, who saw 
Lebanon as their national homeland. The Muslims considered Lebanon 
to be ethnically, culturally aad historically Arab. They possessed 
Arab nationalism and considered themselves to be a part of the whole 
Arab Muslim world. 
The Maronite Christian population decreased due to emigration 
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and low birth rates and the Muslims, particularly the Shiites, increased 
in population. The Christians became a minority with a severly de-
creased power base for the government they dominated. The Confessional 
and National Pact political system is Lebanon gave the Maronite Christians 
predominant (5 to 1) control of the economy. They used that control 
to maintain power and to benefit their own group. Government jobs, 
public services and developmental programs were primarily designed 
to benefit the Maronite Christians. The Sunnis had a share of the 
prosperity but not an equal share. The Shiite and Druze communities, 
because of their minimal power in government, did not share in the 
government programs and the prosperity of the country. 
All of these factors led to the civil war which began in 1975. 
Each group in Lebanon became fragmented except the Druze. Each faction 
militarily confiscated a share of the political and economic power 
in Lebanon. The civil war which is still raging has destroyed the 
sovereignty of the state of Lebanon because the government was so 
weak it could not prevent the intervention of foreign groups and powers 
such as the PLO, Israel and Syria. Syria today is the predominant 
power in Lebanon. Each of the individual seventeen sects who are 
continually vying for power within Lebanon totally controls the sector 
of the state they occupy. The future of Lebanon as a viable state 
appears to be hopeless unless the warring factions can be made to 
realize they must form a new government based on the cooperation and 
recognition of the rights of all groups. They must become a united 
country and the people must be willing to give their primary loyalty 
to the national government. The must develop state nationalism. 
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IV. IS EGYPT A POWDER KEG? 
Egypt has been an independent state only since 1952 when the 
Free Officers of the Army took over the government. The military 
coup did not bring lasting stability to Egypt as the country has ex-
perienced riots, a presidential assassination, and almost continuous 
violence and civil disorder involving religious extremists, students, 
urban poor, etc. Egypt appears to be a country ready to explode at 
any time. The continued rule of President Mubarak appears to be in 
serious doubt. 
Why is Egypt a country ready to explode? Why does it appear 
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that President Mubarak's rule may be overthrown? Because Egypt is 
currently experiencing political instability. Why does Egypt experience 
political instability? Because the people of Egypt lack state nationalism. 
The lack of state nationalism on the part of the Egyptian people differs 
significantly in nature from that in Iraq and Lebanon. The people 
of Egypt are of the same ethnic backaround and are Sunni Muslims. 
Very small and insignificant numbers of Christian Copts and other 
religious groups exist in Egypt. The lack of state nationalism in 
Egypt is not due to a lack of unity as one people as was true in Iraq 
and Lebanon where a great political and economic disparity existed 
among t·he different religious groups to whom the people gave their 
primary loyalty. The Egyptians are one people ethnically and religiously, 
but a lack of shared values and incongruity between the goals of the 
governing elites and that of the people has resulted in a lack of 
state nationalism in the sense that they do not function as one people. 
For example, the primary goal of the President of Egypt is to retain 
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power rather than to develop Egypt in a manner most beneficial to 
the people. Therefore, the people and the government are not working 
together to achieve common goals. The people's dissatisfaction with 
the goals being pursued by the government results in civil disorder 
and instability in government. The masses consider themselves to 
be Egyptians and are proud of their heritage but do not give their 
primary loyalty to the government leadership. Many of the people, 
especially the poor, urban residents, and students support groups 
such as the fundamentalists whom they feel would provide leadership 
most beneficial to them and their country. 
The cause of political instability in Egypt does correspond to 
the six characteristics identified by Clapham. The results of a study 
of the history and internal political, economic, and social institutions 
which are presented in the remainder of this chapter validates Clapham's 
theory and my thesis. 
In ancient times a series of great kingdoms, ruled by pharoahs, 
developed in the Nile River Valley of and made important and long 
lasting contributions in the fields of science, architecture, politics 
and economic. The ancient kingdoms provided a base for the development 
of the modern Egyptian political system. Throughout its history, 
Egypt has remained essentially a united entity ruled by a single government. 
From the sixth century B.C. until 642 A.O. (2500 years), Egypt was 
ruled by Persia, Greece, and the Byzantine empire which resulted in 
the introduction of the Christian religion. Egypt was conquered by 
the Arabs in 642 and since that time has been an Arab and Islamic 
nation. The country fell to the Ottoman Turksin 1517 and was ruled 
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by them until 1798 when it was conquered by Napoleon. 
The last ruling dynasty of Egypt started in 1805 and stayed in 
power until 1952. It was founded by Muhammed Ali, the commander of 
Albanian forces in the services of the Ottoman Turks, who helped to 
drive the French from Egypt. As governor of the loosely held Ottoman 
province of Egypt, Ali began to modernize and develop the country's 
resources. He is recognized as the Father of Modern Egypt. During 
Ali's reign, a distinctive Egyptian national character was encouraged 
and the first seeds of twentieth century nationalism was planted in 
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the junior ranks of the army and the middle class. The Turks recognized 
Ali's family as the hereditary rulers of Egypt. The political power 
structure of one man rule established by Ali stayed in effect until 
1952 when the monarchy was abolished!6 
1. Domination by Western Powers 
In 1840 the Western powers used military force to gain special 
trading privileges for western manufacturers and required Ali to abolish 
Egyptian manufacturing. Ali's grandson, Ismail, sold shares of the 
Suez Canal stock, a joint Egyptian-French project, in 1875 to Great 
Britain to satisfy foreign debts. Ismail was removed from power by 
the Turks to meet the demands of the European powers. He was succeeded 
by his son, Tewfik. Tewfik was overthrown by the minister of war 
in an attempt by the army to rid Egypt of foreign interference. Great 
Britain intervened, disposed of the minister and returned Tewfik to 
power. From 1882 until 1952, the Egyptian Kings and politicians were 
forced to share power and ruled with the consent of Great Britain 
who made it a protectorate in 1882 but ruled it like other British 
colonies. 
The British Consul Generals {called High Commissioners after 
World War J) dictated financial and domestic policy in Egypt with 
the backing of British troops. 
2. Division of Power Within the State 
The division of political power in Egypt before and after the 
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military coup of 1952 is identical to Clapham's patrimonial and nee-patrimonial 
system in which all power is held by the leader of the country to 
whom all subordinates and officials ow~ their loyalty. 
Prior to the French invasion in 1798, political power in Egypt 
was divided among feudal lords. Napoleon placed the country under 
the control of military governors during his five year occupation 
of the country. When Muhammed Ali seized power in 1805, he personally 
retained all political and economic power and used a network of appointed 
provincial governors to preside over the villages. The governors 
were directly responsible to Ali who had established Cairo as the 
center of his regime. Ali's descendants maintained his political 
system and it remained in effect after the British occupied and controlled 
the government of Egypt. British domination of Egypt resulted in 
the development of strong anti-monarch and anti-British feeling among 
the people and had the effect of uniting them behind the Free Officers 
of the army who had strong Egyptian nationalist sentiments. 
A British constitutional expert formalized the Egyptian political 
system with the writing of the Organic Law of 1883. It provided a 
two chamber parliament who possessed only advisory power except for 
the approval of new direct taxes. The King could enact legislation 
without the approval of parliament. The Organic Law also established 
provincial councils to handle local affairs each headed by a Cairo 
appointed governor. Each provincial governor was supplied with a 
British advisor. The Egyptian King and provincial council system 
was under the ultimate control of the British Consul General who was 
backed by the occupying British army. 
The Organic Law system stayed in effect until 1922 when Britain 
officially ended the protectorate state of Egypt. However, British 
troops remained and the British High Commissioner retained almost 
absolute power. At the insistence of the British, King Fuad appointed 
a commission to draft an Egyptian constitution. 
The 1923 constitution retained the extensive power of the King. 
He had the power to dissolve the parliament and rule by decree if 
he found parliament to be uncooperative. All government officials 
were appointed by the King as well as two fifths of the senators. 
The remainder of the senators and the Chamber of Deputies were elected. 
However, only large property owners could qualify as candidates. 
The 1923 constitutional monarch system under the ultimate control 
of the British stayed in effect until the 1952 military coup by the 
Free Officers of the army.77 
The Free Officers had been formed in 1949 to rid the country 
of a corrupt monarch and British domination. They announced they 
were seizing power of government for the people not for the military 
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or a political party. After six months of civil rule, the Free Officers 
forced Prime Minister Ali Mahir to resign, placed the country under 
military rule with General Mohammed Neguib as the prime minister and 
Gama! Abdul Nasser as the deputy prime minister. Other government 
positions were filled by military officers. On February 23, 1953, 
Neguib was forced to resign because he had attempted to return the 
country to the old parliamentary system utilized under the monarch 
system. Parliamentary elections were indefinitely postponed and on 
April 18, 1953, Nasser b~ame prime minister and he and the Reva-
---------------------------- ---------
lutionary Command Council (RCC) and elites of the Free Officers, became 
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the absolute power in Egypt. 
From 1953 to 1956, the RCC and Nasser held sole authority in 
the country and said elections were not being held in order to prepare 
for the transition to democracy. In January, 1956, Nasser and his 
colleagues drafted and issued a new constitution establishing a presi-
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dential governmental system with a strong executive to whom all ministers 
7,9 
were responsible. Nasser surrounded himself with a highly secret 
group called the "Vanguard" which included governors, ministers and 
about 30 Marxists ideologists. Persons in high positions placed their 
political cronies in offices of importance. The system used by Nasser 
is also in compliance with the political power system in third world 
states described by Clapham because government positions were obtained 
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and maintained based on oaths of loyalty and kinship ties. 
Upon Nasser's death in September, 1970, Anwar Sadat (vice-president) 
became the president. With the backing of the army (he was a member 
of the Free Officers), Sadat arrested and removed 90 of the top govern-
ment officials, including the vice-president, replaced them with his 
own people and within one year had complete control of the government. 
He maintained the parliamentary system as a rubber stamp for his policies. 
Sadat retained absolute control and on many occasions did not consult 
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his cabinet or prime minister before issuing new directives or programs. 
Vice president Hosni Mubarak became president when Sadat was 
assassinated on October 1, 1981, and was elected president the following 
year. He has retained the political system used by Sadat and Nasser. 
Mubarak has tried to retain the backing of the Nasserites and the 
Sadatists. As opposition to the political system has grown; he has 
identified himself more closely with the Sadatists. Mubarak was re-
elected president on October 5, 1987 and still firmly controls the 
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government. 
The political power structure in Egypt fits the system described 
by Clapham as being prevalent in third world states because the power 
of government is held by one person. The destruction of the monarch 
system by the military coup simply replaced one patrimonial system 
with another. Nasser and Sadat held absolute power as does the current 
president, Mubarak. All government officials obtain and retain their 
positions by oaths of loyalty or kinship ties to the leader. 
3. Legitimacy of State Government 
According to Clapham, the government of a state lacks legitimacy 
when its political system cannot select and sustain political leaders. 
Most third world states maintain a political system in which rule 
is by a small elite group rather that the consent of the people. 
Prior to 1807, a national government did not exist in Egypt. Twenty 
four feudal lords held power over the area they militarily occupied. 
They seized and maintained power through the use of force and the 
bulk of the people were virtual slaves. 
Muhammed Ali established a central government in 1805 but he 
was an Albanian, not Egyptian. He too used force to stay in power 
as did his descendants until 1952. Until 1883, the system established 
by Ali was an absolute monarch system. After 1883, the system would 
be described as a limited constitutional monarch system because the 
king had to share power with the British who militarily occupied the 
country and an elected parliament was served primarily as advisors. 
The Constitution of 1883 was written by the British and maintained 
the monarch system. Although a constitution existed, the king held 
dictatorial powers over all matters, with the consent of the British, 
except for new direct taxes which must be approved by the legislature. 
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The national government of Egypt from 1882 to 1952 was not legitimate 
according to Clapham's definition because the constitution was imposed 
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upon them by Great Britain. In addition, the ruling dynasty was Albanian. 
The military coup in 1952 allowed Nasser to establish a military 
dictatorship. He ruled for three years without a parliament. In 
1956, Nasser and his colleagues wrote a new constitution which established 
a presidential system of government with a strong executive and all 
ministers of state directly responsible to the president. The people 
approved the constitution by 99.9% of the votes cast. The constitution 
provided for a national assembly with 350 seats but candidates had 
to be screened by the National Union Executive Committee. Th~ National 
Union had been established in May, 1957, to replace all political 
parties in order to control all aspects of public activity and to 
be a focus of public loyalty to Nasser and his regime. An administrative 
structure which spread down to the local level from the higher executive 
committee was appointed and headed by Nasser. It was meant to exclude 
other groups from political power and to be a liason between the government 
and the people. Since a 50 pound fee was required to file for candidacy, 
only the well to do citizens could run for office. The National Union 
was used by Nasser as a rubber stamp for his policies and had no clear 
function other than to provide a forum for Nasser and his colleagues 
for policy announcements. Hopwood states Nasser felt the need to 
establish a political framework even if he had no intention of giving 
84 it any real power. 
The legitimacy of the Egyptian government from 1952 until Nasser's 
death in September, 1970 rested in the hands of Nasser. He became 
more autocratic the longer he stayed in power and used his cabinet 
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as an audience rather than advisors. Nasser controlled the intelligence 
bureau, army, government, ASU (only political party) and thus was 
able to retain absolute power. 
The system created by Nasser did provide for a smooth transfer 
of power and upon his death, Vice-President Anwar Sadat immediately 
became president. Sadat continued the political system created by 
Nasser. He simply purged the government and military of Nasser's 
people and replaced them with his own. Sadat presented a new constitu-
tion in September, 1971, in which he claimed true democracy would 
be returned with a legal system to protect the rights of the individual. 
It did create a national assembly which was allowed to criticize and 
debate more freely. He temporarily retained the ASU as the one political 
party although he placed it under civilian rather than military control. 
Sadat dismantled the ASU and formed his own party, the Naticnal Demo-
cratic Party in July, 1978. Sadat dismantled parliament ar j had 
new elections held in June, 1979. His party won by an overwhelming 
victory. In May, 1980, Sadat had the parliament amend the constitution 
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to allow him an unlimited number of terms. 
When Sadat was assassinated in October, 1981, Vice President 
Hosni Mubarak became president. He has retained the same political 
structure used by Nasser and Sadat but allowed the existence of po-
litical parties except for religious extremists. Mubarak set up a 
new electoral procedure for the parliamentary elections in May, 1984. 
The voting districts were reduced from 176 to 48 and allowed for pro-
portional representation and voting by party slate instead of election 
by absolute majority in the traditional two member district. This 
procedure resulted in the increase of seats in parliament from 382 
to 448 and appeared to give all people and groups representation in 
government. However, two clauses in the new procedure were designed 
to insure Mubarak and the NDP continued control of the government. 
The distribution of parliamentary seats were set up in such a manner 
as to give dominant power to the rural areas in which Mubarak has 
his strongest support. If no party receives 8% of the popular vote 
in an area, the NDP is alloted the parliamentary seat. Mubarak's 
party won an overwhelming majority of the seats in the 1984 election. 
Mubarak has attempted to create a facade to mask his autocracy. Like 
most third world states, the legitimacy of the government rests with 
the autocratic ruler, not the people, and is upheld by military force. 
The political structure does not allow the people to select their 
leaders as elections are manipulated by those in power. Therefore, 
the government of Egypt lacks legitimacy. 
4. Lack of Power Base of Government 
In Iraq and Lebanon, the power base of the government is ethnicity 
and religion. The people of Egypt are of the same ethnic and religious 
backgrounds and the power base of their government has always been 
class or organization membership. 
Under the monarch system of government before 1882, the power 
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base of the king's rule was the small but rich landowning class. After 
1882, the monarchs ruled not only by the consent of the rich landowners, 
but also the British government. The bulk of the people, peasants, 
had no voice in government. 
The Free Officers seized power on July 23, 1952, and established 
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a military dictatorship. All political parties were abolished, civilian 
and parliamentary government was dismantled and a single legal political 
organization, The Liberation Rally, was established. It was not a 
political party but a means of rallying the people round the new rulers, 
an organization to mobilize popular support and to squeeze out political 
opposition. The program of the rally promised everything for the 
Egyptian citizens including a new constitution, an equitable social 
system, a fair economic system and the forced withdrawal of British 
troops. The Free Officers traveled around Egypt soliciting the support 
of the masses for their military regime. By the end of 1953, the 
Liberation Rally boasted of a membership of two million and the military 
regime appeared to have the support of the people because it had rid 
them of the old corrupt monarch system which did not meet the needs 
of the people. 
By the end of 1954, Nasser and the RCC had total power. Personal 
loyalty to Nasser became the key to obtaining and retaining power. 
In July, 1956, Nasser became not only a hero to Egypt but to the entire 
Arab world when he nationalized the Suez Canal. In May, 1957, Nasser 
established the National Union (NU) as a replacement for the Liberation 
Rally and instead of any political parties. The NU was used to control 
all aspects of public activity and to be a focus for public loyalty 
to Nasser and his regime. 
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In order to defuse the appeal of Muslim extremists and to insure 
the support of religious leaders, Nasser ordered the establishment 
of the Islamic Congress with vice-president Anwar Sadat as secretary 
general. The appeal to Islam was intensified after the Egyptian defeat 
in the 1967 Arab-Israel war. Basically, Nasser used the tactic throughout 
his rule of diverting the attention of the people from a problem in 
the country. He used mass rallies throughout his rule as a demonstration 
of the support of the masses. After Nasser's popularity began to 
decline in the mid 1960's, rural village residents were brought to 
Cairo at state expense to participate in the rallies. This conveyed 
the impression of mass support. However, his support drastically 
declined in the 1960's because of military setbacks and brutal suppression 
of opposition. 
When Sadat became president in September, 1970, he continued 
the same system used by Nasser. He abolished the centres of power 
prevalent under Nasser and replaced them with persons loyal to him. 
Sadat had been a member of the Free Officers and had the support of 
the military. He placed his own people in key positions in the military. 
Sadat used national referendums which he controlled, as a method of 
showing support for his regime. Sadat's attempt to gain religious 
support for his rule proved to be a fatal mistake. He manipulated 
the religious extremists against the Nasserites and leftist groups. 
Sadat's attempt to suppress the extremists and regain control of them 
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led to his assassination in October, 1981. 
Vice President Mubarak became president upon the death of Sadat. 
He was also a Free Officer and to date has the backing of the military. 
Mubarak has attempted to stay in power by steering a middle course 
between the Nasserites and Sadatists. The last election results show 
Mubarak's support is in the rural areas and not among the traditional 
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elites. His lack of support in urban areas may prove to be very detri-
mental in the future. Reports from Egypt in 1987 and 1988 indicate 
an alarming increase in the strength of the religious fundamentalists. 
As opposition to Mubarak has increased, he has resorted to the re-
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pressive measures of Sadat and Nasser. He does not appear to have 
rid the regime of rivals and pressures from the extremists continue 
to mount. Mubarak's continued rule appears to be in doubt. 
In accordance with Clapham's theory, the government of Egypt 
does lack a broad base of power. The power base of the government 
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throughout its history has been limited to a small ruling elite. Prior 
to the 1952 military coup, the power base was the rich landowners. 
Since 1952, the power base has been the military. 
5. Lack of Shared Value System Between Government and People 
According to Clapham's theory, the people in third world states 
do not share the same value system as that of the government because 
they are not allowed to participate in the political system. To allow 
the participation of the general population would pose a threat to 
the ruling elites' continued dominance of government. Usually the 
majority of the population is in a second class position within society. 
Therefore, a sense of oneness does not develop between the general 
population and the ruling elite. State nationalism does not develop 
because the loyalty of the general population differs from that of 
the government officials and leadership. 
In Egypt, the government leadership's major goal has been to 
retain power and the primary loyalty of government officials is to 
the ruler rather than the country in order to retain their positions. 
The people's loyalty has traditionally been to their country but in 
the twentieth century has become divided because of dissatisfaction 
with government policies. 
Muhammed Ali became the ruler of Egypt in 1805, and was not liked 
by the people because he was a foreigner (Albanian). He used brutal 
suppression and forced enslavement of the peasants to prevent serious 
resistance for several decades. His goals and values were centered 
around his continued rule. Ali did develop the country economically 
but used force to do so. By the time King Tewfik ascended to the 
throne in 1879, four distinct groups had emerged in Egypt. One group 
consisted of a small number of wealthy landowners who supported the 
king and favored the British intervention in 1882 because it protected 
their economic interests. The second group was a vigorous Islamic 
movement opposed to foreigners. The third group consisted of wealthy 
landowners who desired independence. The final group was an army 
clique of anti-foreign junior officers who saw the king as a tool 
of the Turks. The junior officers were primarily from rural areas 
and their activities led to the development of Egyptian nationalism 
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in their native villages. The young officers, led by the war minister, 
successfully overthrew King Tewfik in 1882 but were subsequently defeated 
by the British. Egyptian nationalism declined until the 1890's when 
it was revitalized by Mustafa Kamil's al-Watani (fatherland) party. 
The al-Watani party, whose membership was primarily middle class, 
was anti-religious and zealously anti- British. They were very nationalistic. 
The death of Kamil and World War I ended the al-Watani party. 
By 1918, the Wafd al Misri (Wafd) party of Saad Zaghdul emerged. 
Its members were primarily middle class but its anti-British position 
enabled it to initially gain the support of the masses. Failure of 
the party to call for social and agrarian reform prevented its support 
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by the peasant masses until the 1940's. The Wafd party received the 
approval of the British and the monarch because they showed a willingness 
to compromise. They had a voice in parliamentary events and their 
leader was prime minister several times during the 1923-1952 period. 
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Bana. It 
advocated the end of secular Egyptian government, a return to Islamic 
social justice, explusion of the hated British and removal of the 
corrupt king. The Brotherhood found a large following among the peasants, 
lower middle class of the urban areas, and students. The leadership 
of the Muslim Brotherhood advocated the use of assassinations and 
other violent methods to achieve their goal. 
The Young Egyptians were active in the pre-World War II period. 
They were a fascist group who also used terrorist tactics in an attempt 
to enforce their ideology on the country. The Nazi defeat in World 
War II saw the decline of their power. 
The country was divided by 1950 into factions, some pro-British 
and pro-monarchy and others anti-British and anti-monarchy. The latter 
groups possessing Egyptian nationalist sentiments but an even stronger 
Arab nationalist sentiment as they considered themselves to be part 
of the whole of the Arab Muslim world. The anti-British and anti-
monarchy groups formed committees, presented demands to the government, 
held almost daily strikes, demonstrations, burnings and riots, and 
attacks against British forces. The anti groups were united in their 
goal of expelling the British from Egyptian soil, but not in their 
ideology. The wide disparity between the lifestyle of the rich and 
foreigners who supported the king and that of the peasant and urban 
dwellers added fuel to the explosive situation. 
Egyptian defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, for which King 
Farouk was blamed, and the daily civil disorder gave the Free Officers 
the opportunity to seize the government in 1952. They did so with 
the backing of most of the people. Only the Muslim Brotherhood opposed 
them. Many of the Free Officers, including Nasser and Sadat, were 
from middle and lower class families and the people felt an identity 
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with them. Had the Free Officers lived up to their original statements 
and instituted a government of the people, they could have truly unified 
the people of Egypt with the government. The Free Officers were initially 
supported by the bulk of the people and it appears likely they would 
have been proud of their heritage as Egyptians and developed a sense 
of oneness as a people. They would have developed state nationalism 
with loyalty to the government being their first priority. 
Nasser's establishment of a military dictatorship, with government 
positions and power based on personal loyalty to him, destroyed Egypt's 
chance for unity and the development of state nationalism. Nasser's 
quest to become the leader of the Arab world, exemplified by his brief 
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union with Syria into the United Arab Republic, further destroyed 
the probability of the development of state nationalism or of a true 
unior between the government and the people. Nasser stressed Arab 
nationalism which was already strong in the country and in 1962, ordered 
the establishment of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) as the only political 
party in Egypt. The ideology of the ASU was the Arab heritage of 
Egypt and Arab Socialism. The ASU was organized into 7000 units in 
villages, factories, schools, and urban areas under the control of 
appointed officials who were answerable to the national congress and 
Nasser. Nasser's Arab nationalist policies were very detremental 
to Egypt's economy. His involvement of the Egyptian military in the 
1964 and 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the civil war in North Yemen resulted 
in severe economic problems as well as the demoralization of the military. 
Arab nationalism was stressed until Nasser's death in 1970. 
Sadat's continued the policies of Nasser with regard to government 
structure and the ASU until 1978. He did stress the Egyptianess of 
the country rather than the pan-Arab position taken by Nasser. However, 
his economic and foreign policy further separated the people of Egypt 
from the government. The Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel 
and Sadat's pro-western politics resulted in Egypt's isolation from 
the Arab world. Severe anti-Sadat sentiments among several groups, 
particularly the religious extremists, developed. By 1977, it had 
become necessary to almost triple the Central Security Force (crowd 
patrol group formed by Nasser). Sadat's attempt to curtail the extensive 
socialist general welfare programs such as the food subsidy program, 
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resulted in urban riots on several occasions. Sadat had been directed 
to curtail social spending by the IMF in order to correct Egypt's 
severe foreign deficit problem. Sadat's opening of the country to 
foreign investors also caused resentment. 
In July, 1978, Sadat dismantled the ASU and started his own political 
party, the National Democratic Party (NOP). He said the NOP would 
stand for democracy and socialism. His control of the political system 
and suppression of any opposition or criticism prevented the develop-
ment of democracy and preserved his dictatorship. All of these factors 
plus the belief by the religious extremists that Sadat was sining 
against the Muslim faith led to daily civil disorder and Sadat's assas-
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sination. 
Mubarak insists he is neither a Sadatist or Nasserite but continues 
the policies of each which he considers to be best for the people 
of Egypt. His continuation of the political system used by Nasser 
and Sadat has prevented the people from developing a sense of oneness 
because the political system is still based on loyalty to Mubarak 
rather than one in which the people have a voice in government. Mubarak's 
attempt to stay in the middle and appease all groups has resulted 
in an ineffective economy and a very shaky and explosive political 
situation. According to Ansari, Egypt is on the brink of a terrible 
upheaval as is indicated by strikes, bomb explosions in Cairo attributed 
to the Muslim militants, and the insurrection of paramilitary police 
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recruits in February, 1986. All of these incidents indicate a rising 
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tide of organized violence against the government. Mubarak has promoted 
corrupt capitalism alongside wasteful socialism in the public sector. 
Any attempt to reduce social programs result in violent strikes and 
riots. Mubarak's liberalization of the political system has allowed 
opposition groups to gain tremendous momentum. Currently five political 
parties are allowed to legally exist and although the Muslim Brotherhood 
is officially outlawed, they do operate openly. Opposition groups, 
particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, have gained tremendous strength 
among the urban poor and students which presents a threat to Mubarak's 
rule. 
As violence and opposition to Mubarak has mounted, he has allied 
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do not share the power of government, they have not developed unity 
with the ruling elite. State nationalism is not present because the 
people and the government leaders do not share common values and goals. 
As indicated by Clapham, when the people and the ruling government 
do not have a shared value system, political instability occurs. 
The exclusion of the Egyptian people from participation in government 
has caused them to become dissatisfied with the government leadership 
and policies. The civil disorders and popularity of opposition political 
parties and groups is evidence of the lack of unity between the government 
and the people. 
6. Manipulation of Economic Resources by Government 
As stated by Clapham, third world states leaders must control 
the political system through the use of force or manipulation and 
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retain economic control in order to finance the political system. 
Egypt's entire history, both ancient and modernrconforms to Clapham's 
theory of economic control and manipulation of the economic resources 
by the rulers. From 1805 to 1882, the economic system of Egypt was 
controlled by the autocratic ruler. He distributed land to his supporters. 
Over one fifth of the land was owned by the monarch and the royal 
family. From 1882 to 1952, the monarch shared economic control with 
the British. From 1850 to 1920, Egypt's economy was based largely 
on the growing and exportation of cotton which integrated the country 
into the world capitalist system. The British occupation and control 
after 1882 allowed them to buy Egyptian cotton for British factories 
and use Egypt as a market for British manufactured goods. Britain 
discouraged industrialization in Egypt and encouraged the government 
to adopt a laissez-faire attitude with reference to the economic activities 
of businesses. As long as the kings received the economic and political 
support of the rich landowners, they did not interfere. Foreign business 
owners and foreign residents were given privileged positions in Egypt 
and were exempt from Egyptian law. 
From 1920 to 1952, Egypt's economy shifted to import substitution 
industrialization (producing goods locally from imported raw materials). 
During the 1920's and 1930's, a severe slump in the demand for cotton 
pointed up the weakness of Egypt's economic reliance on one crop. 
The educated elites began to call for industrialization as a means 
of modernizing the country and the nationalist groups saw industriali-
zation as a means of gaining independence. As a result, several in-
dustries such as building materials, insurance, transportation and 
banking developed. Many of these industries were foreign owned. World 
War II stimulated the Egyptian economy by about 25% because the allied 
troops used Egyptian products and services. An increase in population 
from 10 million in 1897 to 19 million in 1947 caused overcrowding 
on the inhabitable land. Rural migration to the cities resulted in 
a large urban poor class. The life of the poor rural resident did 
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not improve during this period. 
When the Free Officers gained power in 1952 a severe inequality 
in land ownership existed. The large owners, which included the state, 
royal family, rural rich landowners and urban absentee landlords, 
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owned 72% of the agricultural land. The majority of the rural population 
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was landless and worked as laborers. 
In order to remove power from the rich landowners, not only because 
they controlled important resources but to prevent their challenge 
to the new regime, Nasser and the RCC introduced three land reform 
measures between 1952 and 1969. The 1952 Land Reform Law limited 
maximum individual holdings to 200 feddans (one feddan = 1.038 acres). 
Land above that amount would be expropriated by the state and redis-
tributed to landless tenants in plots of two to five feddans. The 
original owners were to be compensated over a 30 year period. In 
1961, individual land holdings were lowered to 100 feddans and in 
1969 to 50 feddans. In 1963, all foreign owned land was expropriated 
and retained by the government. 
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From 1956 to 1961, the government eliminated the power of industrial 
owners by expropriating and nationalizing all major industries. Follow-
ing the Suez Canal War in 1956, the government nationalized all foreign 
owned industries. Very few were transferred to private ownership. 
At no time was collectivization or the end of private ownership con-
sidered. 
The land reform program cannot be called a success because redis-
tribution of the land did not keep pace with expropriation. By 1971, 
nearly one million feddans had been redistributed to almost 350,000 
families. However, by 1978, 95% of the landowners who possessed fewer 
than five feddans held less than half the agricultural land which 
left 5% of the medium and big landowners with nearly 50%. In 1970, 
Sadat allowed big landowners to reclaim their land and they have become 
very prosperous. 
In addition to the land reform and nationalization of industry, 
the government plans the entire Egyptian economy. This had led to 
widespread corruption as persons in key government positions use their 
position to increase their personal wealth. The regimes of Nasser 
and Sadat were noted for extreme corruption. 
Nasser labeled the economic system of Egypt as Arab Socialism 
(not Marxist Socialism) which he defined as socialism adapted to meet 
the needs of the Egyptian people. Because of the constant migration 
to the cities and high birth rates among the urban and rural poor, 
it was necessary to institute social programs such as food subsidies, 
medical care, etc. From 1956 to 1964, the Egyptian economy gave the 
appearance of being prosperous but during the same period it had ac-
cumulated a large foreign debt which is still undermining the economy. 
As a result of the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the western 
powers refused to finance Egyptian projects or sell them arms. Nasser 
turned to the Soviet Union for assistance. With Nasser's alignment 
with the Soviet Union, the U.S. and other western powers stopped all 
aid to Egypt. Nasser borrowed from the Soviet Union to purchase arms, 
subsidized domestic industries, imported needed foods and financed 
the construction of the Aswan Dam. Egypt still owes over $3 billion 
dollars to the Soviet Union.96 
Until 1972, Egypt still used the Import Substitutions Industriali-
zation program. Nasser had agreed to a partnership with the Soviet 
Union in which Egyptian factories were built with Soviet funds and 
used important raw materials from the Soviet Union. The manufactured 
products were sold to the Soviet Union at a price set by them (not 
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market value) which resulted in a growing trade deficit for Egypt. 
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By the end of Nasser's regime, the economy of Egypt was in disastrous 
condition due to his socialist program, the importation substitution 
industrialization program with the Soviet Union, high deficit spending 
on military arms, wars with Israel in 1948, 1956, 1964, and 1967 as 
well as his ill advised war in North Yeman on behalf of the rebels 
against the monarchy. The urban areas experienced periodic riots, 
demonstrations and strikes brought about by the poor economy and living 
conditions among the urban poor. 
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When Sadat became president in 1970, Egypt's oil fields were 
under Israeli occupation, the Suez Canal was closed, massive foreign 
debts existed, and industrial and agricultural production was falling 
along with the per capita income. After gaining firm control of the 
government, Sadat introduced his own economic program to replace Nasser's 
socialism. He announced Egypt would have a mixed economy and would 
have an open door (Infitah) to foreign investors. However, he retained 
government ownership of major industries and control of the planning 
and operation of the economy. The one million state bureaucrats, 
who carry out the government program, owed their loyalty and government 
position to Sadat. This gave him additional political control. Sadat 
continued the government social programs; increased the minimum wage 
several times; and gave tax exemptions to low income persons and small 
farms in an attempt to diffuse civil unrest. He introduced incentive 
programs for farmers in an attempt to increase production. Sadat 
was not successful in his incentive program and it was necessary to 
increase imports each year to provide the necessities for the people. 
When he attempted to raise prices on imported goods or decrease sub-
sidies in an attempt to reduce the foreign debt of Egypt, serious 
riots occurred in the major cities. Major civil disorders occurred 
in 1971, 1972, 1975, 1977 and 1981. 
The results of Infitah appear to be a stagnation of the public 
sector. It cannot compete with the private sector and by 1981 the 
public sector provided only one tenth the nation's productivity. 
By 1980, Egypt was dependent upon aid from the U.S. and European countries 
for its survival. Egypt receives over three billion dollars a year 
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from the U.S. and Europe. 
When Mubarak became president in 1981, he inherited not only 
a chaotic political system but also severe economic problems. Egypt 
has a $40 billion foreign debt plus $3 billion owed to the Soviet 
Union. In 1985, the Gross Domestic Product shrank by 2% while the 
population increased by 3% to over 50 million persons. Mubarak's 
continuation of capitalism along with a welfare oriented socialist 
system created inflationary problems along with a severe balance of 
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payments problem. Egypt imports 40% of its food requirements and 
its food subsidy program costs $2 billion a year. The subsidy program 
is available to all individuals including the affluent. Agricultural 
production is impeded by parallel markets. One is a free market for 
cash crops and the other is the traditional government regulated field 
crop program for which the price is kept below free market prices. 
Farmers do not want to participate in the government program. 
The government is caught in a seemingly incorrectable economic 
bind. Any attempt at reform would threaten the economic prosperity 
of the ruling elite and any attempt to reduce subsidies or increase 
prices to control the foreign debt problem result in riots. Egypt 
is dependent upon continued U.S. aid and since repairing relations 
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with the Arab world, now receives substantial aid from Saudia Arabia. 
Basically, the government does manipulate and control the economy. 
According to Waterbury, the bureaucracy through which the economy 
is controlled has become an entity in itself held together by the 
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source of income and promotion. It appears the bureaucracy to some 
extent controls the leaders. 
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Conclusion 
The data presented in the foregoing pages proves the validity 
of Clapham's indigenous theory when applied to Egypt. Egypt was dominated 
by Great Britain from 1882 until 1952 to the extent that Great Britain 
controlled both the political and economic systems. The political 
power of government was held by the absolute monarch from 1805 until 
1882 and from 1882 until 1952, he shared that power with the British 
government. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak have held all power since the 
military coup in 1952. The system is structured such that all political 
power is based on one's personal relationship and support of the ruler. 
Persons in high government positions have been able to develop their 
own power base and use that position to gain wealth. This power structure 
allows for enormous corruption in government. The government in Egypt 
since 1805 has lacked legitimacy because the political system is not 
designed to allow the people to select leaders and support them. 
Leadership in Egypt has always been obtained and maintained by force. 
The monarchs before and after British occupation and the presidents 
since 1952 have used military and police force to stay in power. 
From the 1952 military coup until 1981, Egypt basically maintained 
a one party political system. Mubarak has allowed additional parties 
to exist but through election reforms has made them totally ineffective 
with reference to their influence on government. 
The power base of the government of Egypt from 1805 to 1952 was 
the small rich landowning class. Since 1952 it has been the military 
and the ruling elite loyal to the president. Nasser was able to obtain 
the backing of the masses for much of his rule because of his success-
ful elimination of the hated monarchy and British domination. His 
unsuccessful military operations, severe economic problems and severe 
repression of critics had diminished his popularity by the time of 
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his death. Sadat's rule was also based on the support of the military 
and a ruling elite. His attempt to manipulate his rivals, particularly 
the religious extremists, led to his assassination. Mubarak has retained 
the system of both Sadat and Nasser but has tried to stay in the middle 
between the two groups which has weakened his power base. Since 1987 
Mubarak has aligned himself more firmly with the Sadatists. 
Egypt's government since 1805 has been a dictatorship in which 
the ruling elite gives their loyalty to the ruler. The government 
officials and leaders have not developed a common value system with 
the people of the country. The primary concern of the president of 
Egypt and the ruling elite is the maintenance of political power not 
the development of the state or meeting the needs of the people beyond 
that which is necessary to maintain order. Civil disorder during 
the rule of Sadat and Mubarak has been more violent and persistent 
that during the rule of Nasser. It appears that each ruler has further 
divided the people rather than uniting them with the government. 
Nasser missed the opportunity to unite the people when he first gained 
power because he had the backing of the masses and extreme popularity 
at that time. Instead of developing a oneness as Egyptians between 
the government and the people, he concentrated his efforts on becoming 
the leader of the Arab world and stressed Arab nationalism. 
Since 1805, the Egyptian economy has been controlled and manipu-
lated by the ruler and his appointed bureaucracy. Nasser made Egypt 
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an Arab socialist country. Due to severe economic problems and pressing 
foreign debts, Sadat attempted to institute a mixed economy with both 
socialism and capitalism and opened the country to foreign ownership. 
Mubarak has not been a forceful leader. It appears his middle of 
the road policy has left him in a political and economic quagmire. 
If he attempts to reform or dismantle the corrupt bureaucracy, which 
is draining the country of valuable wealth and resources, he will 
jeopardize his political support. Mubarak's strong alignment with 
the New Democratic Party, and electoral reforms which prevent access 
to power for other political parties while allowing them to exist, 
presents a serious threat to his continued rule. The continued and 
increasing violent activities of the religious extremists, which Mubarak 
appears to be unable to control or prevent, is the most serious threat 
to his future rule. The serious economic problems of Egypt only add 
to the political crises which exists. If Mubarak attempts to reduce 
government spending or subsidies in an attempt to reduce the foreign 
debt of Egypt, he risks total chaos in the cities on the part of the 
urban poor who give their support to, and cooperate with, the Muslim 
Brotherhood. He cannot eliminate the large government owned industries 
or sell them to privately owned businesses without displacing the 
state bureaucracy which supports his regime. Mubarak appears to be 
in a position from which he cannot extricate himself. News reports 
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over the past two years have indicated a tremendous increase in militancy 
by the extremists and urban dwellers. According to Clapham, dictators 
cannot survive without the support of the urban dwellers, professional 
trade associations and university students. 
As the concluding portion of this chapter indicates, the six 
characteristics identified by Clapham as beinq present in politically 
unstable third world states, are present in Egypt. The power structure 
of the government in which a small ruling elite controls political 
and economic activity has prevented the development of a sense of 
oneness on the part of the people with the government. The primary 
goal of government leaders is to stay in power rather than to adopt 
policies most beneficial to the country and the people. Until the 
general population of Egypt is allowed to participate in government, 
they will not develop a common identity with it. Only after the people 
and the ruling elite give their first loyalty to their country (Egyptian 
nationalism), can the government become stable. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The preceding three chapters have traced historical developments 
in Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt in order to demonstrate the roots of political 
instability in the failure to develop state nationalism, a sense of 
unity as one people on the part of the people within the geographic 
boundaries of a state in which people share a common identity, and 
a sense of pride in their state and its identification as an independent 
entity of the world. State nationalism develops only after the people's 
pride in their state takes precedence over their ethnic or religious 
group membership and after the people and the government officials 
share common values and goals. Political instability in third world 
states according to Clapham is due to western domination: distribution 
of political power within the state: government is not legitimate: 
absence of a broad power base of the government: lack of a shared 
value system between government and the people: and manipulation of 
economic resources by government. The historical data concerning 
developments in Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt prove the validity of Clapham's 
theory and my thesis. 
Clapham argues that domination by the western powers during the 
colonization period before or the mandate period following World War I 
is partially responsible for third world state political instability. 
During this period of western domination, colonial and mandate powers 
drew political boundary lines without regard to the ethnic and religious 
background of the people being incorporated into the new state. This 
action on the part of the western powers has resulted in considerable civil 
disorder because the new states incorporated include groups with histories 
of previous bitter rivalries and incompatable cultures. Moreover, 
the western powers established political and economic systems in the 
new states and in the existing states controlled by the colonial and 
mandate powers which would be most beneficial to them rather than 
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the people of the state. The political system established was invariably 
one of a small but elite ruling class which would cooperate with the 
western power. The economic system was an exploiting capitalistic 
system in which the western powers were able to extract raw materials 
and import manufactured goods. This resulted in the economic under-
development of the third world state. 
Iraq was created by Great Britain in 1920 under the mandate system. 
The British incorporated the predominant Shiite Muslim Province of 
Basra, the Sunni Muslim dominated Province of Baghdad, and the oil 
rich Province of Mosul which included a large contingent of Sunni 
Muslim Kurds. The Shiites and Sunnis have a long history of rivalry 
and the Kurds a long history of demands for an independent Kurdish 
state and refusal to give up their native Kurdish language and culture. 
Great Britain installed a constitutional monarch system of government 
with the Sunni Muslims and an imported Muslim King from Arabia in 
control of the native government. Great Britain controlled the political 
and economic system, established military bases and signed agreements 
with Iraq which gave British companies exclusive rights to extract 
Iraqi oil in Mosul. 
Lebanon was created by France in 1919 under the mandate system. 
The French joined Maronite Christian dominated Mt. Lebanon with the 
Muslim cities of Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Tripoli and the Biqa Valley. 
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Sunni Muslims occupied the cities and the Biqa Valley while the Shiites 
and Druze occupied Southern Lebanon. The French established a political 
system in which all government positions were to be held by the leaders 
and elites of each religious group with the Maronite Christians holding 
superior power over all groups. The Muslims did not want to be separated 
from Greater Syria and initially refused to cooperate with the Maronite 
Christian (pro-French) government. The capitalist economic system 
was dominated by France and the Maronite Christians. The forceful 
inclusion of the Muslim areas into a Maronite Christian dominated 
country and the division of power on the basis of religion proved 
to be disastrous. 
Egypt came under the direct control of Great Britain in 1882 
when they militarily intervened and restored the king to the throne 
ostensibly to protect their investment in the Suez Canal. They controlled 
the political and economic system of Egypt in the same manner as their 
colonies and used force to require the King to appoint officials of 
their choosing and to abide by their policies. The native government 
was a monarch system upheld by a small and wealthy landowning group. 
Britain controlled the economy in order to export Egyptian cotton 
to British factories and import manufactured goods. 
As the early history of Iraq and Lebanon indicates, the western 
powers incorporated non-compatable people into a state causing polariza-
tion of the people along ethnic and religious group lines rather that 
encouraging the people to unite as one people and form a cohesive 
country. The polarization in Egypt was based on wealth as well as 
pro and anti-British and Monarch sentiments. Egyptian nationalist 
sentiments were growing during this period, particularly on the part 
of the growing middle class, but it was subsequently minimized by 
strong Pan-Arab sentiments during Nasser's reign. 
The second characteristic identified by Clapham as helping 
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to explain political instability in third world states i~ the hierarchial 
distribution of power in government. The power of government is the 
personal property of government leaders and officials who use their 
positions for personal benefit and that of their support group. Subordinates 
retain and maintain their government positions based on oaths of loyalty 
or kinship ties. 
The division of power in Iraq from 1920 to 1958 placed government 
in the hands of the Sunni Muslim king and a ruling elite. Great Britain 
had veto power over all decisions until 1932. The election system 
allowed wealthy Sunni families, tribal sheiks and Shiite religious 
leaders to control voting in their area and place their own hand picked 
candidates in parliament. Since the king depended on the backing 
of the ruling elite for retention of the throne, he did not interfere 
with their political manipulations. Each political leader considered 
his government position to be his own personal property and used it 
for his own personal benefit. The Iraqi government lacked trained, 
honest and dedicated persons who would operate the state in a manner 
most beneficial to the country and the people. Corruption was rampant. 
Since the overthrow of the monarch in 1958, the government of Iraq 
has been in the hands of the Sunni Muslim dominated military autocracy. 
Parliament has not been reinstated and all power belongs to the president, 
the military occupied RCC and the Baath party over which the president 
presides. The Shiites and Kurds are given very little voice in govern-
ment although since 1983, the Kurds have been allowed to run their 
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own local government as long as it is consistent with President Hussein's 
policies. 
The division of power in Lebanon from 1920 until the present 
has been based on religious affiliation. Until the civil war began 
in 1975, the government was a coalition of all religious groups but 
the Maronite Christians maintained virtual dictatorial powers because 
they controlled the office of the presidency. This resulted in the 
appointment to and control of all high government offices by Maronite 
Christians. France had veto power over native government affairs 
until the beginning of World War II. The historical data concerning 
Lebanon very clearly reveals how each government official, whether 
Maronite Christian, Sunni Muslim, etc., used his office to benefit 
himself and his electoral district which was usually his own religious 
group. This religious based political system deeply entrenched the 
already existing intense Christian-Muslim rivalry and rivalry among 
the Muslim groups for political and economic control of the country. 
Today, each of the seventeen warring factions in Lebanon controls 
the political and economic activity within the area they militarily 
occupy. 
The division of political power in Egypt from 1882 to 1952 was 
shared by Great Britain, the Monarch, and the small but wealthy land-
owning group. The military coup in 1952 ended the monarchy and the 
power of the landowning ruling elite. Nasser and the military officers 
of the RCC assumed all government power at that time. Nasser and 
Sadat were part of and had the backing of the military as does the 
current president, Mubarak. All government positions since 1952 have 
been distributed on the basis of personal loyalty to the president 
and kinship ties. Widespread corruption existed in the Nasser and 
Sadat regimes and to a lesser extent in Mubarak's regime. 
The division of political power in Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt does 
correspond to the definition and explanation given by Clapham and 
helped to create political instability. 
The third characteristic associated with political instability 
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in third world states according to Clapham is the question of the 
legitimacy of the state government. Clapham states third world state 
governments have not established governmental systems capable of selecting 
and sustaining political leaders. Constitutions have not survived 
because the division of power was not based on the consent of the 
people but on the desires of the elite, thus they lack legitimacy. 
Iraq's government during the British mandate period was officially 
labeled constitutional monarchy and was modeled on the British system. 
However, the king retained dictatorial powers since he could dissolve 
parliament, corrunanded the military, and appointed all officials. The 
constitutional monarch system was retained after Great Britain granted 
independence to Iraq in 1932 but the balance of power shifted. A 
wealthy Sunni and tribal sheikh landowning class had developed after 
1900 in Iraq and occupied government positions. With the removal 
of the British mandatory government, the King needed the backing of 
and had to share power with the wealthy landowners and the army. 
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Since the 1958 revolution, all power of government has been in the 
hands of the military autocracy and the Baath party. Changes in government 
leadership have been the result of military coups except in 1979, 
when Vice President Hussein was promoted to the presidency by the 
RCC and Baath party. At no time during the history of Iraq has government 
been based on the consent of the people. The 1970 Iraqi constitution 
has not been implemented and government continues to be a military 
autocracy. 
The Lebanese government lacks legitimacy because it was established 
by the Christian majority, of which the Maronite Christians were the 
largest groups, without consultation with or imput from the Muslim 
communities. The constitution of 1926 has not been revised to show 
the changing composition of the Lebanese state. According to scholars 
on the Middle East, by 1950 the Muslims had a majority status. The 
manipulation of the election system by the Maronite Christians prevented 
the government from beinq by the consent of the people. The Lebanese 
government has no power. 
The government of Egypt also lacks legitimacy. The king of Egypt 
shared power of government with Great Britain from 1882 to 1952. 
An appointed parliament held only advisory powers. Politics in Egypt 
from 1952 until 1981 was a military dictatorship and a one party system 
with a hand picked parliament to rubber stamp presidential policies. 
It is still a military autocracy. Several political parties currently 
exist but they have no voice in government due to election manipulation 
by President Mubarak. The distribution of government power is not 
based on consent of the people. 
The fourth characteristic of Third World States identified by 
Clapham is the government's absence of a broad power base. In most 
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third world states, extreme competition occurs between political parties, 
if allowed, or different factions within society for control of state 
power. Rulers in third world states establish coalitions, destroy 
their rivals,and manipulate oppositions groups in order to retain 
power. 
The history of Iraq shows the monarch government which existed 
until 1958 based its power on a very small but rich landowning group 
and after 1930, the army. After 1958, the government's base of power 
has been limited to the army and the Baath party whose active and 
influential members include about 20,000 of the countries' eleven 
million people. 
The power base of the government of Lebanon from 1920 until 1975 
was the Maronite Christians who until the 1950's were the largest 
single group in Lebanon and part of the slight Christian majority. 
Today the official government is powerless and power in Lebanon is 
shared by the warring factions within the country. 
The power base in Egypt from 1882 until 1952 was a small but 
wealthy landowning class. The 1952 revolution destroyed that power 
base and shifted power to the military. Nasser initially had the 
backing of the masses because he had rid the country of a corrupt 
king and a hated British colonial power. He manipulated public opinion 
through the use of mass rallies with supporters bused in to participate. 
When Nasser resorted to brutal and repressive measure to control dissention, 
his popularity declined among the people and the military. Sadat 
and Mubarak have also based the power of their government on the military. 
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Sadat removed the Nasserites from the military and government positions 
and replaced them with his own people. He also manipulated the religious 
fundamentalists against the Nasserites which eventually led to his 
assassination. Mubarak appears to be trying to steer a middle course 
between Nasser and Sadat's policies, but has placed his own people 
in key positions. Since all persons in high government positions 
retain and maintain their positions on the basis of loyalty to the 
ruler, the power base of the government is basically the government 
officials and the bureaucracy. 
The fifth characteristic identified by Clapham is the lack of 
a shared sense of nationalism among the people because each group 
has retained its ethnic, religiou or other values as primary. The 
political system in third world states is one in which the ruler and 
government officials consider their government position to be personal 
property and their power base is kinship ties or oaths of loyalty. 
This system prevents the development of a sense of common values, 
formation of a national self identity, and the development of a shared 
value system between the government and the people. 
The ruler of Iraq was not an Iraqi and did not attempt to unite 
the people. With British military backing, he built a power base 
for his government among the wealthy Sunni Muslim and tribal leaders, 
many of whom were also Sunni Muslims. He excluded the Shiites, Kurds, 
and common people from power. This prevented the development of a 
sense of one people and the development of a national identity. Tribal, 
ethnic and religious membership remained the primary value of the 
bulk of the people. The military coup in 1958 simply shifted 
the power base of the government to the Sunni dominated military. 
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The current president, Hussein, also uses military and police power 
to force the people to conform to government policy. The Baath party, 
which is the only political party, is pan-Arab in sentiment and stresses 
the Arab heritage of the State and Arab socialism instead of Iraqi 
nationalism. Consequently, the masses have retained the ethnic, religious, 
tribal and village loyalties as their primary value system. 
The value system in the Lebanese state has always been based 
on religious affiliation. The Maronite Christian dominated government 
imposed by the French and the distribution of government power on 
the basis of religion firmly entrenched those values. Lebanese na-
tionalism was intially present among the Maronite Christians who saw 
Lebanon as their national homeland. After World War II, Maronite 
Christian domination, the quest for power by various religious groups, 
and foreign intervention caused all religious groups except the Druze 
to become fragmented. Today the Muslims are divided not only into 
Shiites and Sunnis but into factions within each group. Some Muslims 
are pro-Syrian and Baathist in their ideology; some are pro-Iranian 
and desire a theocratic state; and some desire to develop independently 
within the Lebanese state. The Maronite Christians are also divided. 
Some are pro-Israeli and desire a close alignment with the west while 
others advocate alignment with Syria and other Arab states. The Druze 
appear to want an independent Lebanese State with each group (Druze, 
Sunni, etc.) retaining their own identity. 
The value system in Egypt has undergone changes as leadership 
has changed. Egyptian nationalism was growing among the middle class 
before the British intervention in 1882. Nationalism continued to 
grow during the monarch period but the people were not united except 
that they were all anti-British and anti-monarch. The people were 
divided into fundamentalists who wanted a theocratic state, young 
Egyptians who wanted a fascist type state, Arab nationalists who wanted 
to become part of the total Arab world and others who wanted to develop 
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a free and independent Egypt. After the 1952 revolution, Nasser advocated 
and allowed only Pan-Arabism. All other groups were ruthlessly suppressed. 
Sadat removed and suppressed the Nasserites who were pan-Arab. He 
stressed the Muslim and Egyptian heritage of the country. Mubarak 
is trying to perform a balancing act between the policies of Nasser 
and Sadat and has allowed a multi-party political system to develop. 
However, his own party retains dominant power. The Egyptian people 
appear to be proud of their heritage but do not share common values 
and goals with the government leadership and bureacracy. The primary 
value and goal of the government leadership is retention of power 
rather than the development of Egypt in a manner most beneficial to 
the people and the country. As a result, Egypt today is a hodge podge 
of ideologies. The country is like a volcano ready to erupt. 
The final characteristic identified by Clapham is the manner 
in which the economic resources of third world states are manipulated 
by the ruling elites in order to stay in power. All economic planning 
is done from the standpoint of political gain and the state becomes 
the broker between domestic and external interests. Usually the economy 
is based on the extraction of commodies for trade on the world market, 
non development of domestic industries and the importation of manu-
factured goods. This results in the underdevelopment of the state 
and in most instances requires the borrowing of huge amounts of money 
from international organizations in order to finance domestic consumption 
and government spending. 
The Iraqi economy was controlled by the ruling landowning elite 
(about 2% of the population owned two thirds of the land) and the 
monarch until 1952. Great Britain had monopoly control of the Iraqi 
Oil industry. After 1958, the military and Baath party nationalized 
industry, Iraqi oil, and the vast majority of land. Private land 
ownership is strictly limited. The government plans and manages all 
production and distribution of goods in order to finance its regime. 
The Lebanese economy was controlled by the Maronite Christians 
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with some ownership and control by the urban Sunni Muslims (5 to 1 
ratio). Since the Maronite Christians controlled the office of the 
presidency from the time the country was created, they were able to 
retain control of the economy. During the 1950's and 1960's, the 
Lebanese economy prospered but became dependent upon tourism, exporta-
tion of goods, banking, and light industry. The civil war which erupted 
in 1975 destroyed the economy along with the political structure. Today 
each warring faction controls economic and political activities within 
the area it militarily controls. 
The Egyptian economy was manipulated by Great Britain, the monarch 
and the wealthy landowners until 1952. The economy was primarily 
based on exportation of raw materials until the mid 1930's when it 
shifted to the importation of raw materials for industrial production. 
As in Iraq, 90% of the people in Egypt were landless and were virtually 
tied to the land. After the military coup, Nasser nationalized industry 
and land and all economic planning and management was in the hands 
of the government (Arab Socialism). Sadat opened the system to allow 
private ownership and foreign investment in Egyptian industry and 
Mubarak has maintained the system, but economic planning and management 
is still in the hands of the government. 
Basically, the results of the developments in Iraq, Lebanon and 
Egypt are identical to the six characteristics identified by Clapham 
as being responsible for political instability in third world states. 
The control of the government by an elite group in Iraq and Egypt, 
while under the monarch system and after independence, and the control 
of the government of Lebanon by the Maronite Christians as well as 
the division of power on the basis of religion, has prevented the 
unification of the people. 
The people of Iraq do not share a common identity with the ruling 
government because it has made no effort to develop a national Iraqi 
identity. The ruling government espouses Arab nationalism. The failure 
of the government to incorporate the people into the political system 
has allowed them to retain their ethnic, village, religious or tribal 
group membership as their primary value system. Therefore, neither 
the common people nor the government leadership has developed state 
nationalism. Political unstability in Iraq has been the result of 
ethnic, religious, or tribal unrest as well as power struggles among 
members of the ruling military and Baath party. If the government 
leadership would encourage Iraqi nationalism and incorporate the people 
into the government, state nationalism and political stability would 
gradually develop. 
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The political system of Lebanon is completely fragmented. The 
people of Lebanon have always given their primary loyalty to their 
religiou group. Additional fragmentation is based not only on religion 
but differing ideologies within the religious groups. The lack of 
unification of the people and failure to develop a common identity 
and state nationalism has resulted in chaos in Lebanon. 
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The people of Egypt are divided into a hodge podge of nationalistic 
sentiments. The emphasis on Arab nationalism by Nasser from 1952 
until 1970 had a very detrimental effect upon national unity. Nasser's 
initial popularity with the masses would have allowed him to unite 
the people with the government had he attempted to do so. Opposition 
to Nasser grew in the 1960's in the form of Marxism, Egyptian nationalism 
and Islamic fundamentalism. Sadat unleashed the groups suppressed 
by Nasser while suppressing the Arab nationalist Nasserites. Mubarak 
recognizes all groups except the fundamentalist, but manipulates the 
electoral process to retain dictatorial powers. The denial of a share 
of power in government to important political groups has resulted 
in almost daily unrest. The fuse to the powder keg appears to be 
very short. Since the people are politically fragmented, they do 
not share a common identity with the government. The people and the 
government do not share common goals and values and have not developed 
state nationalism. 
The historical data presented does prove that state nationalism 
did not develop in Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt because of the six character-
istics identified by Clapham as being responsible for political instability 
in third world state, which includes Middle Eastern States. 
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